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CIVIL WAR IN NIGERIA: A CONTINUING
EXPLOITATION OF AFRICAN TRIBALISM

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OF AFRICAN TRIBALISM

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INTRODUCTION

The civil war in Nigeria between the Federal Military Government and the self-proclaimed Republic of Biafra entered its third year on June 6, 1969. During the two years of armed belligerency Biafra had dwindled in area under effective control from an original total of 29,000 square miles to approximately 2,500 square miles.¹ Its population has been reduced from approximately 13-million² to now roughly one-half that number.³ Despite such dramatic losses to its resources and confronted with little apparent prospect of ever obtaining the complete independence originally sought by the Biafrans, there is as yet no positive sign that this conflict has approached any form of bilateral resolution between the combatants. For a period of the last half of 1968 and early 1969, the people of the world community were exposed by the news media to the tremendous destruction of peoples' most important human value -- life itself, particularly that of women and children. Now only occasionally is there much publicity regarding the war and little concerted effort is made to stop the waste despite the fact that already more civilians have lost their lives as a direct result of this conflict than is the case in the Viet Nam and the Arab-Israeli continuing confrontations.⁴

To the casual observer the conflict is simply one between the Nigerian government and the Ibo tribesmen; it is limited to an arena wholly within the geographical boundaries that originally depicted the state of Nigeria, and it is being fought for a simply described value entitled freedom. If such a superficial analysis were true the conflict would most likely

never have arisen, or if it had in that context, it would have been resolved some considerable time ago.

It is accurate to describe the arena of physical combat as that within the limits of Nigeria, but because of the interests at stake in the final outcome, a large part of Africa is really involved in the conflict. Not only is a much larger area involved, but so also are there a large number of actual participants in the conflict supporting the combatants, each with its own hierarchy of values at stake in the resolution. Particularly interesting to note are the unusual alliances that have been formed, many of which are a result of relatively recently developed goals, and others that are a rebirth of colonial aspirations (if those ever completely ceased to exist.) For example, the Federal side finds its support not only from the mild form of continued United States recognition that it constitutes the only valid government, but also from the combined military assistance of Great Britain, Russia, and Egypt. While formal recognition of Biafra has been very limited in the world community of nations, both France and Portugal have given considerable support to the Biafran government without which it is doubtful that the war could have continued nearly as long. Other international participants in the conflict involve the regional Organization of African Unity, the multi-national Commonwealth of Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and certain private multinational organizations such as the World Council of Churches and Caritas, the Catholic Relief agency. All of the above parties are attempting to maximize certain human values that they deem to be the most important

and while some of these values are exclusive to the Nigerian crisis, the far greater portion are inclusive of interests that transcend the internal conflict itself.

It is the purpose of this paper to attempt to analyze the Nigerian conflict from two distinct but interrelated aspects. The first is to determine why the combat situation has continued for such a lengthy period and why it will continue for some considerable time in the future. The second goal is to examine the interplay of the important participants and how the goals each is seeking have contributed to the continuation of the hostilities. Traditional international law in which the roles of various nation-states can be depicted in either black or white by the use of set rules simply is inadequate to a useful examination of a conflict such as that in Nigeria in the present day world. A more useful methodology is to be used in this paper that hopefully will result in a less superficial analysis of the conflict, enabling a more enlightened view of one aspect of the world power process. 5

I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA UNDERLYING THE BIAFRA CONFLICT

PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD

Fundamental to any comprehensive understanding of the present conflict in its true perspective must be a historical discussion of the development of Nigeria from the early European interventions up to and including the declaration of secession by Biafra. Only in the light of such a historical discussion can the true roles of the participants and their present expectations be properly analyzed in a true perspective.

The first recorded European explorers to visit the coast of what is now Nigeria were the Portuguese Fernao do Po and Pero de Cintra who investigated the Bights of Biafra and Benin in the winter of 1472-73.⁶ Although this was the first Portuguese venture into this particular area, the Portuguese considered themselves to have the exclusive rights to all of the West Coast of Africa by virtue of certain Papal Bulls they had obtained as early as 1451.⁷ It was not long after do Po before the Portuguese established the first European settlement in the area on the island of Sao Thome. There was no native resistance to their acts as there was no indigenous population on the island. Once they were established the Portuguese then sought a source of labor to support their trading operations with the coastal natives. Slavery was a common phenomenon among the coastal tribes and its victims were readily sold to the Portuguese. It was not long before the local whites discovered that the slaves they obtained could be resold to the prospering gold merchants of the West Coast for twice their

original cost. By 1510 the European trade with the natives⁸ of Benin was almost exclusively in slaves. And so began the first exploitation of African human lives to satisfy the economic desires of the Europeans.

The earliest European competitors of the Portuguese were the Spanish, but with the discovery of the Americas the Spaniards turned to the exploitation of another hemisphere, leaving Portugal in a very secure position in West Africa for at least a time. The end of the Portuguese monopoly of trade on the West Coast was marked by the voyage of the English explorer, Windham, into the area in 1553.⁹ The English soon successfully challenged their predecessor's position and Britain was established as not only "a leading trader on the coast,¹⁰ but as one of the chief exporters of slaves."

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the West Coast become a "centre of European enterprise and rivalry¹¹ with slaves as the prize," There was no one single tribe whose population provided the entire body of slaves sold to the Europeans by the natives of the Delta states, but one of the most called upon sources was the populous Ibo tribe of the interior.¹² One prominent Nigerian historian, Michael Crowder, quotes with approval an estimate of an early slave trader that between the years 1800-22 some 370,000 Ibos had been sold into slavery by their fellow Africans. Crowder then concludes : "This may seem a tremendous figure, but it certainly had its raison d'etre since then, as now [sic] Iboland's chief problem was one of¹³ over-population."

The beginnings of the establishment of British colonies

in Nigeria was marked by the English abolition of the slave trade in 1807. The apparent paradox of such an act was that at the turn of the century England had been the "chief carrier of slaves from West Africa."¹⁴ Humanitarian principles of course may have played some part in such an uprighteous decision, but the real value served by this change of policy remained an attempt to maximize the wealth value of Britain's trading economy and native well-being was only incidental. At the time under consideration palm oil was a very important commodity that was used in the manufacture of soap and as a major lubricant for emerging European industry. "While the slave trade continued, production in the oil growing areas of the interior of West Africa would always be hampered. It was therefore very much in the interests of Britain to check slavery in order to permit the economic exploitation of the coast."¹⁵ After the abolition Britain's palm oil trade continued to increase in the region to become Nigeria. By 1834, for example, it was worth £500,000¹⁶ per year which was a huge sum for those times. Yet all economic activity remained restricted to trading operations on the coast through the African kings and middlemen who strongly resisted any penetration into the interior by Europeans. Of singular assistance to the native attitude was an extremely high mortality rate of the non-Africans caused by malaria. This discouraged any permanent settlements on the mainland, particularly in the interior.

Quinine was successfully used as a prophylactic against malaria in 1852 and soon after life was possible for the Europeans in the interior of the country.¹⁷ With control of

the sources of the palm oil no longer denied to the traders they were soon followed by consuls established by Britain in the Niger Delta region to regulate trade. These diplomatic endeavors soon proved inadequate to produce sufficient affection of the independent natives and action was taken which would eventually lead to the creation of a colonial domain in an attempt to satisfy British economic interests.

DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH COLONIAL RULE

The first British intervention in the actual political structure of the Niger region occurred in 1851 when the slave-trading King of Lagos was deposed by the British who replaced him with his more tractable uncle. This partial solution did not fully satisfy the British economic interests and so in a proclaimed attempt to put a stop to the slave trade, Britain occupied Lagos in 1861. In July 1861, the local ruler ceded Lagos to the British and thus "half in the guise of humanitarian motives, Britain had gained her first foothold on the Nigerian coast primarily to secure her trade."

The British had expanded their sphere of control over the peoples to include by 1866 the territory of the Yoruba tribe adjacent to Lagos -- at the expense of native rulers and the French who were seeking to promote their own colonial interests among the Yorubas to the west of Lagos. The newly acquired British area was attached to the Colony of Lagos to form the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos. The period between 1878 and 1882 witnessed an ever increasing rivalry develop between the British United African Company and the French Compagnie du Sénégal et de la Côte Occidentale d'Afrique each seeking to

promote its own national economic interests. Finally the French were forced out of business in the area in 1884 when the British undercut already low prices by as much as 25 per cent²² and emerged with full control over the western region.

As a direct result of the colonial settlements of the Berlin Conference of 1885, the British formally proclaimed a protectorate of the Niger districts by which both Lagos and the Oil Rivers Protectorate to the east were directly administered by the British government. The territories and people in the center of present day Nigeria and the valleys of the Niger and Benue Rivers were placed under the control of the Royal Niger Company which operated by virtue of a charter granted the same²³ year.

The charter of the Royal Niger Company was revoked in 1899 and the British government assumed direct control over the entire²⁴ northern area as the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria as described by external boundaries agreed upon with the French by²⁵ the Convention of 1898. The southernmost tip of the northern territory was merged with the Niger Coast Protectorate to form²⁶ the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. In 1906 Lagos was²⁷ joined with Southern Nigeria to form the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria which was then administered entirely from Lagos. Sir Frederick Lugard, a man much blamed for subsequent²⁸ Nigerian political idiosyncracies, was appointed as High Commissioner of the territories in 1900. During the period 1906-12 he established the beginnings of effective administration of both the North and South.

The administrative amalgamation of the North and South

was finally achieved in 1914, but it was Lugard's philosophy that dictated the maintenance of a considerable distinction between colonial institutions of the North and South. One of the reasons for such a decision was Britain's economic policy of colonial self-sufficiency,²⁹ but at least equally a consideration was Lugard's idealistic conception that it was the task of Britain to carry justice and freedom throughout the world and to implement that policy there should be in the colonies:

equal admiration for those who achieve in matters social and racial a separate path, each pursuing his own traditions, preserving his own race purity and race pride, equality in things spiritual, agreed divergence in the physical and material. ³⁰

His philosophy created a system of indirect rule and "tended to preserve tribal consciousness"³¹ when indeed there were at the time no inconsiderable differences between many of the various tribes, especially the "majority" Hausa-Fulani, Ibo and Yoruba groups.

In the North the climate was semi-arid and characteristic of these inhabited areas surrounding the Sahara Desert. The Hausa-Fulani group embraced the Moslem religion and had dominated the region for some time. Its powerful governmental institutions of emirates had been well established by the sixteenth century and exhibited a well organized fiscal system and a trained judiciary subject to the control of only a few individuals.³² The Northern economy, religion and culture had been oriented toward the Sudan and the Arabic states to the north for centuries and largely ignored the tribes of the south.³³ To the present day the "Moslem elements comprise the majority of the people in the north."³⁴

Two main tribes existed in the generally moist, rain-forested South. In the western region were the Yoruba who were dominant. This section was the most homogeneous culturally. Even before British colonial rule had been imposed, modern forms of government were operating, organized into cities and towns with a clan system in only the rural areas. The important decision-makers of the Yoruba were the chiefs who as in the North³⁵ were also very powerful within their individual domains.

The eastern region of the South was comprised mainly of the Ibo solely by virtue of their abundant population. Here there were no strong political institutions before the British. The tribal society was controlled by a loose chieftan-counsel arrangement which had very severely limited authority and was dependent to a great degree upon a familial type relationship which if necessary imposed sanctions on members of the tribal unit.³⁶ It has been said with considerable accuracy that "the precolonial Ibos seem to have had no political cohesion."³⁷

In 1914 and the years following, the British adopted completely different policies with regard to the administration and development of the political institutions of the North and South based on the characteristics of the people as set forth above. In the North Lugard retained and strengthened the established governmental organizations and firmly established the position of the existing rulers despite what their strength may have been without British support. The colonial decision-makers formulated the policies, but the rulers were left to administer them. Thus even the rulers who had earlier come into power by force were enabled to retain that power with British

support which thereby gave the native leaders of the North
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 unassailable authority.

Not only were the emirs of the North strengthened by the colonial political system established by Lugard's policies, but it was further agreed with the Sultan of Sokoto that there would be no interference with the Moslem religion. No Christian missionaries were to be permitted into the Northern areas
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 without permission of the local rulers. This agreement was to have far-reaching consequences, not particularly because of the possibility that there may have been converts to Christianity, but more important from the standpoint that one of the universal indirect consequences of the missionaries' zeal was the enlightenment of the African natives in Western European economic and political concepts as well as language.

No such agreement with regard to missionary activity was made with the native leaders of the pagan and animistic oriented South.

"They [the missionaries] were convinced that their own society was superior, and also that the conversion of the local people would have to be not only from the traditional religion [sic] but from the whole way of life which intertwined with it and supported it. They therefore deliberately set out to change the very structure of traditional society. Until the beginning of the twentieth century they had made only comparatively small inroads into Nigerian society." 40

The Yorubas because of their more organized society and accessibility were the first to benefit from the Western education espoused by the missionaries. It was not long before they became the necessary native administrative class of the British colonial system. Initially the Ibos of the East did not benefit to any great degree from the missionaries' efforts principally because of all areas, Iboland remained the least subject to the British

colonial control of its institutions and was relatively disagreeable bush.⁴¹

The Yoruba educational and social supremacy in Western culture was not destined to last. Once roads and railroads began to penetrate the Ibo regions of the east and the members of the tribe were able to (1) benefit from the educational efforts of the missionaries and (2) to reach the rest of the colony, they left their overcrowded homeland in search of new opportunities. So great was their zeal that "within the space of only one generation the Ibo . . . emerged as an economic as well as a political threat outside his homeland."⁴² Since the Moslem communities of the North conducted only a very modest educational program tailored carefully to the traditional demands and values of the native authorities, it became of necessity that the Southerners were imported into the North as the vital clerks and artisans of the new concepts. These initially small groups of educated Southerners became concentrated in the sabon garis (strangers' quarters) of the Northern townships which were the centers of intensive secondary acculturation and the foci of the eventual Northern awakening.⁴³

DEVELOPMENT OF NATIVE PARTICIPATION THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL REFORMATION

The colony was given its first constitution in 1922. This instrument provided for the first time in British Africa for the election of African members to a Legislative Council.⁴⁴ The Legislative Council was comprised of 36 British and ten native Nigerian members who were responsible for the Southern Protectorate and Lagos. The Northern Protectorate continued

to be ruled by the Governor by proclamation aided by the advice
 of an Executive Council.⁴⁵

A uniform institutional structure for the entire colony was not forthcoming until the Richards Constitution of 1946. Its proclaimed objects were to (1) promote the unity of Nigeria; (2) provide adequately within that unity for the diverse elements which constituted parts of the country; and (3) secure greater participation by Africans in the discussion of their
⁴⁶own affairs. Under the Richards provisions the Legislative Council tripled its native membership while the British component was reduced to one-half its former strength. The most significant of all its modifications relative to the Biafran conflict was the creation of regional advisory Councils for the newly created Eastern, Northern, and Western Provinces. The Council now legislated for the whole of Nigeria, but much
⁴⁷decision-making power was given to the regional governments.

The provinces were designated regions and each region was given a larger and more representative legislature by the
⁴⁸Macpherson Constitution of 1950. These regional assemblies were also enlarged and given additional legislative and financial powers. Each had its own Executive Council in which there was a majority of African members. Revenues were to be distributed to the regions according to need rather than as
⁴⁹formerly on the colonial basis of derivation.

Ever increasing demands for national independence and for greater autonomy for each of the three regions led to the formation of the Federation of Nigeria under the provisions of the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954. This charter was to

become the foundation of the government of independent Nigeria. It emphasized even more the regions at the expense of the central government by a grant of all residual powers to the regions. The regions were to a large extent independent in the management of their financial affairs. They were permitted to determine their own electoral system and both the East and West instituted direct elections while the North continued to use an indirect system. ⁵⁰

Each region now had its own governor who in his discretion appointed a regional premier and other lesser regional ministers on the recommendations of his premier. ⁵¹ The 1954 Constitution was very important in that it marked:

the end of the nationalist struggle with Britain; for the next six years, until the achievement of independence on 1st October 1960, Nigerian leaders were preoccupied not so much with wresting power from the colonial government as dealing with the day-to-day administration and development of their country as well as settling the basis on which they would cooperate with each other. ⁵² [emphasis added]

The lack of a common enemy and the prospect of independence did not insure tranquillity among the Nigerians by any means. Regional differences began to take on at times violent overtones which would subsequently increase after independence. For example, as a result of certain alleged indignities suffered by the Northern leaders earlier from verbal attacks by Southern politicians, the Northerners announced an eight point plan for their Region which, if implemented, would have amounted to its virtual secession from Nigeria. Southern political leaders campaigned in the North against these proposals. They also campaigned for national independence to be granted in 1956. The latter was opposed by Northern leaders who would be dependent

upon the educated Southern immigrants to carry out a large part of the functions of government.⁵³ Tensions ran high and they finally erupted into violence which resulted in four days of riots in May, 1956, at Kano in the Northern Region directed against the Southerners in the sabon gari. The official result indicated thirty-six were killed and 241 wounded; "although it is almost certain that the numbers were much larger."⁵⁴ The British had only briefly departed the effective political arena when two themes to become common to Nigerian politics in the future surfaced: (1) Threats of secession and (2) Use of violence to obtain political goals.

As a result of several changes made to the existing constitution in 1957, both the Eastern and Western Regions of the South became internally self governing in August, 1957.⁵⁵ The Northern Region lacked the educational background and though it had embarked on a large scale education program,⁵⁶ it

"refused to be rushed into self government on the grounds that [its] Northern cadres were not ready to take over the region's administration. With eighteen million people to govern and only a handful of university graduates, and probably no more than 2,000 holders of school certificate, [sic] the formation of a Northern administration would be dependent upon expatriates or Southerners." ⁵⁷

The Northern Regional leaders again considered secession, but finally consented to follow suit and became self-governing in March 1959.⁵⁸ With the stage set, October 1, 1960, was planned as the date for independence. Native political parties began the campaign for the national elections scheduled to be held in December 1959.

NIGERIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Nigerian political parties of course did not just spontaneously

appear for the 1959 elections. They had been a major force in the internal decision-making processes of Nigeria for some time. The first political party in Nigeria was the Nigerian National Democratic Party founded in 1923. It really represented more of the awakening of national consciousness among various sections of British West Africa rather than a truly Nigerian party.

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The first Nigerian party to be internally oriented and to have continued existence was the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) founded in 1944 by an American-trained Ibo graduate, Nnamdi Azikiwe. Because of Dr. Azikiwe's charismatic hold over his fellow Ibos, it soon became the Ibos who supplied the chief support for the NCNC.

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A second major political party was formed by a Yoruba, Abafemi Awolowo, from a tribal cultural organization. In 1951 this became the Action Group (AG). Although the AG was not exclusively Yoruba, the main basis of its support was with the Yoruba intelligensia and traditional tribal ruling elements.

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Initially the North was little affected by the political parties of the South during the period 1945 to 1951, but since indirect elections were scheduled for 1951 as a result of the 1950 Macpherson Constitution, the Northern People's Congress was established (after the primary stages of the election had been held) as a Northern base to "treat with the Southerners on a national level."

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The party's leaders were the Sarduana of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello, and a former Northern teacher, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.

These political parties, the AG of the Yorubas, the NCNC of the Ibos, and the NPC of the Hausa-Fulani, each handily won

control in the 1951 elections of the region in which its tribe was predominant. Then "each one set out to consolidate its power [in its region] by reducing the opposition."⁶⁴ During this period marked by the preparation for independence and consolidation of power, the major Nigerian parties continued to develop along tribal and regional lines -- a circumstance that was later to have many unfortunate results. If the character of the parties are to be described, they might be called parties of "communal integration" in that they "give the communities the sentiment of being represented and it is through them that the communities are integrated into the play of national and Regional politics."⁶⁵

Therefore, while on the eve of independence Nigeria had three major political parties contending for power in the national arena and apparently had avoided the one party system of many of the other emerging African states, in reality none of the parties was organized on the basis of a truly national appeal. There was one controlling party within each of the three regions and that party also represented the major tribal group of the region. When this fact is considered, then it is not surprising that as a result of the 1959 federal elections the NPC won most of the Northern seats, the AG the majority of the West, and the NCNC controlled the Eastern allocation.⁶⁶

No one party controlled enough seats in the Federal Parliament so it became necessary to form a coalition federal government. Awolowo of the AG sought to join with Azikiwe of the NCNC to give control to the South. However, Azikiwe and the NCNC had made a pre-election commitment to the NPC. They decided

to fulfill that obligation and the AG was left as the opposition. The Prime Minister was Balewa of the NPC and the Governor-General was Azikiwe of the NCNC. Many reasons have been offered for the North-East alignment. One of the most plausible suggests that because Azikiwe was the most consciously nationalist of all the Nigerian leaders, he may have felt that the new nation would not have been able to survive the strain that would have been engendered by a North-South parliamentary confrontation.⁶⁷

One of the reasons behind the nationalist feelings and the subsequent coalition decision by Azikiwe is the fact that while NCNC strength was in the East, it also represented the Ibos. As has been pointed out earlier, the Ibos had emmigrated from Iboland as soon as the means were available. During the period now under discussion they were disbursed throughout the country, both North and South, in large numbers in or about all the major urban centers.⁶⁸ The best protection of both Ibo and Eastern interests then logically dictated a position which would insure the NCNC an effective role in the decision making process in the national arena while also attempting to maintain the integrity of the entire nation.

II. POST INDEPENDENCE CONFLICT AND SECESSION

Nigeria became independent October 1, 1960, as the Federation of Nigeria.⁶⁹ It comprised an area of 356,699 square miles and a population of approximately 35-million persons to make it the largest of all African nations.⁷⁰ The new nation was expected to be the leader of the host of newly emerging African states of the period and to also be one of the major effective participants

in the arena of African politics. It was considered to be the ultimate example of what an enlightened British colonial policy could do. In general, the native population was well educated. Since 1947, the people had been exposed to long and apparently constructive participation in the national decision-making processes in a government that had possessed a high degree of autonomy before independence was granted. The Nigerian economy was well established on a firm foundation mainly because of a large agricultural surplus for export in addition to bright prospects of large petroleum reserves in the southeastern section of the country.⁷¹

Retrospect shows that within the country itself there was a malignancy created by tribalism, educational and religious differences, all magnified by internal political struggles for power that eventually resulted in the present civil war.

THE POLITICAL PARTIES STRUGGLE FOR POWER

The drift toward a one-party system in each of the regions was further illustrated by the regional elections held after independence. The elections for the Northern Region House of Assembly seats were held in May 1961. The NPC won 160 seats,⁷² the AG nine, and the NCNC only one. The defeat of the Eastern politicians had been almost complete, but the NCNC was not to be outdone on its home ground. In November 1961, the elections for the Eastern Region House of Assembly were held. The results gave the NCNC 106 seats, independents twenty, the AG fifteen,⁷³ the Small Dynamic Party five, and the NPC none. In the same manner the AG controlled the Western Regional Assembly with 63 per cent of the seats compared to the second place NCNC with

27 per cent. The remaining 10 per cent went to independents.

The results of the regional elections of 1961 illustrate also that no one party had absolute control within its region. The reasons for this fact are twofold. In the first place, because of the regional tribal character of the parties, the Yorubas and Ibos living in the North looked to the AG and NCNC respectively as their advocates in the regional political arena. Secondly was the fact that although each region had its dominant tribes, in total there are over 200 distinct tribal groups in Nigeria. These minorities could defend their interests only to the degree they could ally themselves with the dominant parties of other regions than their own. The combination of these two forces allowed certain sections within each region to elect a representative from a non-dominant or independent party.

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Even though the NPC-NCNC coalition Federal Government gained in cohesion in its early period and remained a viable entity until the end of a full term of Parliament, showing signs of internal

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dissention only in its last year, that does not mean the struggle for control of the central government by each of the parties by any means ceased. The NPC was firmly entrenched in the tradition-oriented Northern Region which had the largest population. The NCNC only was similiarly situated in the East and also was strongly supported by Ibos everywhere in the nation. The AG, on the other hand, with its Yoruba-Western orientation,

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had been a collective association from its beginning and never enjoyed the strength the other two parties exhibited in its internal structure. This fact was recognized by the other parties who realized the Western Region was the arena that could provide

complete control of the Federal institution if only the affection of the AG could be removed and its supporters rallied behind either the NCNC or the NPC.

THE WESTERN ARENA

The leadership of the AG sought on the one hand through Awolowo to campaign on the national level and to seek a NCNC-AG coalition, while another faction led by Chief Akintola sought to secure the party's position in the West and not risk the possibility of endangering a possible "regional security" arrangement between the competing parties. This divisiveness from within was even more accentuated by the passage of a Government sponsored motion in March 1962, which proposed the creation from the territory of the West a new Midwest Region.⁷⁸ The Western Regional Assembly quite correctly diagnosed this move when it censured the action as one intended "to destroy Western Nigeria by fragmentation."⁷⁹ Yet even before regional elections could be held in the newly created Midwest, the AG began to break apart from within.

In May 1962, an attempt was made to oust Akintola as the Western Premier by certain AG leaders because of alleged "mal-administration, anti-party activities and gross indiscipline."⁸⁰ The National Executive Council of the party led by Awolowo approved and demanded Akintola's resignation. Before the month of May could end the Western House of Assembly was called upon to vote approval of a new regional Premier. Awolowo followers were confident of their majority, but the Akintola faction received the support of the NCNC members to cause riots in the Assembly meeting before any vote could be taken. After the second riot

in the Assembly, the Federal Parliament met for only one day to
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declare a state of emergency in the Western Region.

An administrator was immediately appointed and restrictions were placed on the activities of all leading politicians. Within two months of Federal control all of the Akintola and NCNC group had been released, but the "officeholders and many of the principal organizers of the Action Group remained restricted." 82
Awolowo was shortly removed completely from the Nigerian political arena when in November 1962, he was convicted and sentenced to prison for 10 years on charges he had planned to overthrow the Federal Government. Interestingly enough, uncontroverted evidence was introduced at the Awolowo trial which clearly indicated the AG had sent men abroad for military training and also that arms 83
had been smuggled into the West.

As a result of the convictions of Awolowo, Chief Enahoro, and many of the other leaders of the AG, they were at least temporarily unable to participate in the establishment of the new Western Region government at the end of the year when the State of Emergency ended. Akintola thus resumed his former position as regional Premier, but this time his support was derived from the NCNC and an AG splinter group, the United People's Party (UPP). In return for the NCNC support the Western government supported the referendum to be held in its Benin and Delta Provinces in July 1963 on the proposed Midwest Region. 84

CREATION OF A FOURTH REGION AND THE NATIONAL CENSUS

The vote was favorable to the formation and the Midwest Region was created. Elections were held in early 1964 which gave almost complete control of the regional government to the

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NCNC. During the period the struggle was being carried out in the West for political power, the NPC had established almost complete control of the North. Because of its large population, the North increased its power which in turn began to manifest itself at the federal level. The Northerners "began to behave less like senior partners and more like tolerant but firm

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masters." Because of the changes brought about by political consolidations of bases of power, the nation became definitely well advanced in the process of changing from a North-East coalition to a North-South confrontation.

The key to the political control of the nation that the North was depending upon was based on a favorable distribution of population. All politicians began looking forward to the results of a new census. The last one had been taken in 1952-53 and had given the North only a very slight majority in the total number of persons. A new census which would possibly reallocate seats in the Federal House of Representatives was initially conducted in 1962. Its results showed the North with a 30 per cent increase, but the West and the East indicated increases varying from 120 per cent to 200 per cent. Several attempts were made to reconcile the totals, but finally "in view of the loss of confidence in the figures" the results were never published. A new census was scheduled for November 1963. The final results of the 1963 census were made public in February 1964, and indicated Nigeria's total population to be 55,653,821-- an overall increase of 74 per cent in a decade. The North rose by 67 per cent, the East by 65 per cent, and the West by almost 100 per cent.

The totals, if accepted, would be reflected in the Federal

Parliament by giving the North 167 of a total of 312 seats. If the strength of the NPC was as great in the North as the party assumed, there was an excellent chance that after future Federal elections there would be no need for the North to share the control of the central governmental institution. The leaders of the NCNC of course objected loudly that the figures were "inflated [and] worse than useless."⁹⁰ The North accepted the figures as did the NPC dominated Federal Government. The political leaders of the Western Region saw a guaranteed opportunity to improve their position in the Federal government if they aligned themselves with the North which needed their support for a change. They would also be able to rid themselves of the Ibos and the NCNC who had become increasingly unpopular and disliked among the Yorubas.^{90a} Thus the West supported the NPC position. When the Midwest recognized there was no hope for the Eastern position, it also supported the results of the census. The East could only continue to object knowing its futility. Now opposed by a North-West combination, Eastern hopes were based on the fact that if somehow it could gain enough seats in the North in the approaching Federal elections to prevent a NPC majority, the West would join in a Southern coalition government.

THE POST-INDEPENDENCE FEDERAL ELECTION

On December 4, 1964, President Azikiwe dissolved the Federal Parliament and the first post-independence federal elections were scheduled for the thirtieth of that month.⁹² All of the old political parties regrouped for the coming election under two headings. The National Nigerian Alliance (NNA) was led by the NPC which combined with the newly formed Nigerian National

Democratic Party established by Akintola. By this time he was in firm control of the West. The other contender was entitled the United Progressive Alliance (UPGA) and was led by the NCNC under Dr. Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region. ⁹³

Shortly before the elections were to be held the NCNC realized just how much its position in the national political arena had deteriorated, especially in the Northern provinces. Okpara sought to postpone the upcoming election apparently seeking time to attempt to regain much of the ground that had been lost. He objected to the election date and alleged again fraud in the 1964 census and also that UPGA candidates were being almost completely excluded from participating in the campaign in many of the Northern provinces. In fact, many of the NPC candidates were returned unopposed in provinces where UPGA supporters had been specifically designated to run. ⁹⁴

A meeting of the leaders of the regions was held in Lagos on December 29th to determine whether the elections should be held as scheduled. That same day after the conference the Premier of the Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, issued a statement charging that the real purpose of the Lagos meeting had not been to resolve the election dispute, but to discuss the secession of the Eastern Region from the Federation. ⁹⁵ Thus, the threat of secession again crept into the negotiations for national power, only this time it was the East. The threat was unsuccessful in delaying the elections which were to be held as scheduled. The UPGA stated it would boycott the elections and not accept any government based on the results. At the same time it called "for the holding of a conference on the 'break-up' of the Nigerian

federation."

The voting turnout was good in the North and West on the scheduled date, but the declared boycott proved almost complete in the East. Before the new government was formed, the leaders of the parties met again in Lagos and the NNA offered to allow the UPGA a role in the decision-making processes of the federal government. On the basis of these promises supplemental elections were conducted in March 1965 in the areas where the boycott had been effective. The final results of the federal elections gave the North-West coalition NNA 198 seats compared to 108 for the UPGA in the Parliament. Independents held the remainder.

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THE WESTERN POLITICAL ARENA REVISITED

The West had not yet completed its role in the maneuvering for political power. Elections for the Regional Parliament had not been held since the "emergency" which had retained Akintola in power. The NNDP was well situated, but it had yet to win a fully contested regional election. There still then remained some small glimmer of hope in the eyes of the UPGA leadership that if it could win the regional election, it would at least control the South in the regional governments and then more effectively threaten secession.

There were ninety-four seats at stake, but although the UPGA campaigned very vigorously, the regional government reported a large number of NNDP candidates had been returned unopposed. The UPGA protested without effect, as it had earlier in the North, that its candidates had been fraudulently excluded by the ruling NNDP, but that was only the beginning of the UPGA problems. On election day:

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policemen found thousands of ballot papers in the illegal possession of electoral officials who were appointed by the regional government. Many of the ballot boxes were stuffed; it was the consensus of impartial observers that the election had been rigged to give the NNDP a three-to-one victory. 99

The actual victory was even greater as the final results gave the NNDP a total of seventy-three seats as compared to only nineteen
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for the UPGA. The frustrations and anger of the followers of many of the UPGA candidates who had been favored were vented somewhat by outbreaks of violence against the regional government such as setting fire to "scores" of homes of government
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functionaries.

The violence done to the juridical concepts of the constitutive system resulting from the Nigerian political maneuverings which took place after independence had a considerable tribal undercurrent whose major advocates were the political parties. The beginning of a new phase in the struggle for power was soon to change the nature of the Nigerian political arena.

EXTRA-JURIDICAL ATTEMPTS TO SECURE POWER --1966 COUPS

January 15, 1966, marked a sudden change in the political structure of the nation and a change in the method of seeking to achieve desired values. On this date many junior army officers (mostly Ibo) who were dissatisfied by the conduct and results of the electoral process and also many highly irregular financial dealings by politicians in power, led a military coup d'etat by which they intended to rectify matters. Federal Prime Minister Balewa and his Finance Minister, Chief Okotie-Eboh were kidnapped and subsequently found slain. The Premier of the Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, and the Premier of the Western Region, Chief Akintola, also permanently ended their

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political careers in the same manner. The fact that all the government leaders who were killed were not Ibos and had represented non-Ibo interests while the coup leaders were

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predominantly Ibo army officers, understandably aroused considerable suspicion among the other tribes as to the exact character of the takeover--particularly in the light of the Ibos' continued political reversals.

IRONSI GOVERNMENT

On January 16th, Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, a Northern-born, Hausa speaking Ibo who had been the commander of the Nigerian army for almost a year¹⁰⁴ and is generally agreed to have not been originally connected with the coup,¹⁰⁵ established control of the government. What had actually occurred in the two day period was a coup within a coup as the "original conspirators who overthrew the government . . . [were] killed or arrested or forced to submit to General Ironsi's¹⁰⁶ rule." Ironsi then directed the Cabinet to give him full powers. He then proceeded to abolish the Constitution, suspend the Parliament, the offices of Prime Minister and President, and all the regional governors, premiers and legislatures. As a final step, he appointed a military governor for each region under the newly created Federal Military Government.¹⁰⁷ The new government banned civilian politicians¹⁰⁸ and commenced a program designed to emphasize the central government with a proclaimed purpose of ultimately eliminating regionalism and tribalism in the country (a theme reminiscent of the FCMG's original goal). Ironsi issued two decrees on May 24, 1966, to effectuate his plan. One decree established a unitary state in order to remove all

regionalism. The second dissolved all political parties until January 1969, and also banned "all tribal unions propagating political ideas or tribalism."¹⁰⁹

Very shortly after Ironsi's decrees were issued, violence began in the Northern Region directed at the Ibos. Thousands of unarmed civilian Ibo tribesmen were mutilated and killed by mobs. In some instances allegations were made that the police and soldiers also participated in these assaults. Charges were made by Ibos that the real instigators of all these acts were the "prominent Hausa and Yoruba political leaders," and thus it was claimed that "the massacres were a deliberate political act, rather than . . . the spontaneous expression of the grievances of undisciplined people."¹¹⁰ Whether the latter was the case or not, immediately after the first of the riots and killings, thousands of Ibo refugees began to return to their traditional homeland in the Eastern Region where Ironsi had appointed Colonel C. Odumegwu Ojukwu as the military commander. The ever increasing politico-tribal character of a violent confrontation continued to act as a catalyst until events culminated in a counter-coup staged on July 29, 1966. This time the mutinous troops were led by officers of Hausa tribal origin. Ironsi was killed, as were the Western Regional Commander and approximately 200 Ibo army officers.¹¹¹ Any previous fiction that had existed of unified, non-tribal Nigeria could no longer remain a viable concept after this time.

GOWON GOVERNMENT AND NEW RIOTS

Once again there was some initial confusion as to who would lead the new government when control was assumed, but on

August 1, 1966, Lieutenant Colonel Jack Yakubu Gowon announced without opposition that he was to be in charge of the Federal Military Government. He also announced that he did not believe a unitary government could succeed in Nigeria and he planned to again place primary emphasis on the development of the regional system.¹¹² The Ibos immediately became political scapegoats and a conflict arose which assumed an almost exclusive aura of revenge against the members of that tribe -- not unlike that which was expressed at other times against the Jews of Eastern Europe or the Asians of East Africa.

It was not long after the Gowon's government became firmly established that new outbreaks of tribalism took place in the Northern Region. Beginning on September 23, 1966, both troops and mobs of civilians of Hausa origin began to massacre Ibos in the North, including the town of Kano again. Reliable estimates indicated that by October 3 more than one thousand Ibos had been killed.¹¹³ Estimates for the month of October place the death toll at twenty to thirty thousand Ibos because of the riots.¹¹⁴

Once again many of the Ibos of the North took flight to seek the refuge of Iboland which remained under the control of Ojukwu. It has been estimated that approximately two million refugees were given asylum in the East after the last Northern riots.¹¹⁵ In reply to the acts of the Northerners, many of the Ibos of the East and the ever swelling refugees sought retribution against people of Northern origin who were residents of cities and towns in the Eastern Region. Hundreds of Northerners were killed when they attempted to escape the Ibos' wrath.¹¹⁶ Naturally,

when such acts became known in other parts of the country the position of the Ibos in outside communities became even more tenuous than before.

At last all Ibos were called upon to return to the East from all other areas of the country and all non-Easterners were expelled by Ojukwu's order. ¹¹⁷ Ojukwu's government seized approximately one-third of the rolling stock of the Nigerian Railways, obstructed the movement of all oil products from Nigeria's main refinery and seized several aircraft belonging to the Nigerian Airways. ¹¹⁸

The period from October 1966 to May 1967 was marked by various abortive attempts to reach some sort of reconcilliation between the Eastern Region and the rest of Nigeria, but no common denominator could be found. Claims and counter claims were made by each side against the other and negotiations steadily deteriorated. Ironically, it was the East with the majority of its population comprised of the Ibos who had in turn advocated and had the most to gain economically from a strong central government which finally declared itself to be the independent Republic of Biafra on May 30, 1967. ¹¹⁹

CHARACTER OF THE PROCLAIMED REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA

The original boundaries of the proclaimed Republic of Biafra were identical to those of the former Eastern Region. ¹²⁰ As such, its population numbered approximately 14-million and its territory encompassed an area of roughly 29,000 square miles.

IBOS OF BIAFRA

At the time of Biafra's declaration of independence, it embraced more people than the African nations of Algeria, the

Congo, Ghana, or Morocco. It contained in addition to the Ibos approximately five million persons belonging to the minority tribes of the Efiks, Ekois, Ibibios and Ijaws. The declared purpose in the seceding from Nigeria had been to protect the Ibos from the violent acts carried out in other regions against the members of that tribe and none of the Biafran minority groups were active in advocating such a separation. It was pointed out at the time of secession that "the non-Ibo, reluctant inhabitants of the Eastern Region at the best of times, have no enthusiasm for becoming citizens of an Ibo-dominated republic."¹²¹

Since the Ibos occupied the dominant role as the decision-makers of the new republic it is important to explore their character in more detail than as set forth earlier. In the first place, to describe societies merely as tribal does not necessarily simply connote that their members are primitive. Tribe means an ethnic group and "African tribes" . . . are as different from one another as Swedes are from Spaniards or Welshmen are from Walloons."¹²² No one knows for certain the origins of the Ibos, but anthropologists generally agree that the Ibo society was not similar to any of the other tribes of the area. One very interesting theory is advanced by a former British missionary, G.T.Basden, who feels because of many similarities in art, speech and community practices between the Ibos and the Hebrews, that the Ibos may have migrated from the Nile Valley centuries ago.¹²³ Unlikely as the assertion of Basden may seem, there is a good deal of support for the proposition that the Ibos do actively seek to identify themselves with the modern-day Israelis.

Whatever their origins, once released from Iboland by modern communications and armed with the education of the European missionaries, they spread throughout the country's major urban centers. They strove to become superior to other tribal groups "as if in some hidden alliance with the Puritan ethic."¹²⁴ It has been said of the Ibo that:

Outside his region the Ibo may be hated or mildly resented or publicly respected, but he is seldom loved. Like the Biblical Israelites, with whom the Ibos share some cultural parallels, clannish, enterprising, with an unbending will that some describe as arrogance. Others equate it with the character of the modern day Israelis, a people the Ibos admire.¹²⁵

Colonel Ojukwu has stated:

There are parallels here. The Israelis are hard working, enterprising people. They've suffered from pogroms. So have we. In many ways we share the same promise and the same problems.¹²⁶

Only one more example of many available will be given to illustrate the Ibo attitude toward the Israelis. When meetings were held in Addis Ababa between the combatants, the Nigerian representative, Chief Enahoro, derogatorily stated that the Biafrans were trying to convince the outside world that "they are another race of Jews who want to form a state of their own because of oppression by fellow countrymen in Nigeria."¹²⁷ The Biafrans replied by stating that their case had "rarely been put so succinctly."¹²⁸

Many other examples may be put forward to demonstrate the asserted comparisons of the Ibos to the present day Israelis and there are many similarities. It is only necessary at this juncture to note that not only have they been so associated by some non-Ibo authorities, but more importantly that the leaders of Biafra actively seek to encourage such identification among

the members of the tribe.

PHYSICAL ASSETS OF BIAFRA

Taken as a whole, the Eastern Region had been agriculturally self-sufficient and able to export approximately \$70-million of foodstuffs annually before the outbreak of hostilities. However, the agricultural surplus of the region did not come from Iboland, which in even the best of times was an agricultural deficit section. It was the lands of the minority tribes to the north and east of the Ibo that provided so amply for the region.¹²⁹

Expediency at the very least demanded the inclusion of the traditional lands of those tribes in the newly formed state in order to better protect the economic independence of the Ibos regardless of the attitude toward independence of those peoples.

Agricultural abundance was not the only physical asset of the region for of even more importance to the Biafrans was the area's potential as a major petroleum producer in the world community. Although Nigeria is not generally considered in the same category as the states of the Middle East, it was the world's tenth largest producer of crude oil in 1966.¹³⁰ Before the outbreak of hostilities, crude oil was the largest source of Nigerian foreign exchange earnings.¹³¹ It is initially more expensive to produce, but its very high quality and low sulphur content¹³² have made it attractive to consumer nations. Another good reason for the growing importance of Nigerian oil in the world is that:

The Suez crisis in 1956 . . . frightened the major [oil] producers into reconsidering the merits of Nigerian oil despite its relatively high production cost. If Nigeria could be developed as an alternative to Middle Eastern oil, the Western petroleum industry might be able to weather the vagaries of Arab nationalism.

The large European and American oil companies have a total investment in Nigeria of over a billion dollars, and even more important, Nigerian oil production was the fastest growing in the world--in 1966 alone it increased an incredible 53 per cent. 133

At the time of Biafra secession Britain was dependent upon Nigerian production for 10 per cent of its crude oil supply. The Nigerian share of the British petroleum market was expected to increase to 20 per cent by 1972. 134 British firms had invested over £200-million in Nigerian oil fields which produced 20.5-million tons in 1966. The other major participant was the United States whose private investment in Nigerian oil was approximately \$300-million just before war broke out. 135

What makes the subject of Nigerian petroleum reserves particularly relevant to an examination of Biafra's assets is the fact that in 1966, 67 per cent of Nigeria's oil was derived from fields in the Eastern Region. 137 In addition to being the center of Nigeria's most developed oil fields, the Biafran city of Port Harcourt was the site of Nigeria's only oil refinery. 138 Control of such a valuable asset by a new state not only raised the pleasant prospect of a substantial foreign income, 139 but also provided a useful tool with which it might have been possible to force both tacit and formal recognition by leading participants in the world community.

Biafra felt it might be able to force the oil companies to make royalty payments to its government by monopolizing on the possible interruption of Middle Eastern oil with the outbreak of the Six Day War which occurred at precisely the same time. Britain might have had to extend formal recognition as a price for essential petroleum products otherwise unavailable.

This most valuable asset to the Biafrans, both economically and politically, was not located in the Ibo section of Biafra at all, but in the Delta section which was occupied by the "rivers minorities" who had traditionally been resentful of the Ibos. 140

Once again the need to create an independent viable state with the greatest prospect of success required that another minority area was of necessity included in Biafra by the Ibo leaders without the consent of its peoples. Even had this section not been the source of the petroleum reserves, it was vitally important because it was the only area which could provide the Biafrans with direct access to the sea -- an important fact if surrounded by a hostile neighbor to the north and west and mountains to the east, as was the case when secession was declared.

The Shell British Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria did make a token payment of \$700,000 to the Biafran Government for royalties alleged to be due, but then Lagos responded by imposing a naval blockade on all oil exports from the East and no more royalties were paid to Biafra. 141

The Six Day War did not materially affect the long run supply of oil to Europe and no formal recognition was forthcoming to the Biafrans by virtue of the possible availability of its oil reserves. Not only did no recognition follow from its petroleum interests, but in addition as Biafra was essentially without a navy, the Federal blockade was wholly complete denying a source of very necessary foreign exchange to the new nation.

III. PROGRESS OF THE WAR

INITIAL CONFRONTATION

Just three days before Biafra's independence was declared

General Gowon attempted to blunt the Ibos' argument for secession by declaring a federal system to be comprised of twelve states, one of which would be the East Central that encompassed the traditional Iboland.^{141a} These states were to be largely self-governing, but the Federal Government did reserve the right to declare a state of emergency and assume control. The Biafrans flatly rejected the plan. They first pointed out what could be done by the declaration of a state of emergency as illustrated by the example of the Western Region in 1962. A second reason for Biafran rejection of the proposed plan was that the Ibos would then be restricted to a power base that was not only landlocked but overpopulated and economically dependent upon the rest of Nigeria--a result obviously unacceptable to the aggressive Ibos unless they could control the central government: a possibility extremely remote by that time.

When Ojukwu declared Biafra's independence he promised to "respect all treaties and to assume Eastern Nigeria's share of all subsisting international debts and obligations." He continued:

We shall faithfully adhere to the Charter of the African Unity Organization and the United Nations Organization.

It is our intention to remain a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations in our own right as a sovereign and independent nation. 142

Gowon replied by stating that the secession was only a move by a "clique of evil men" and there was no popular support behind the secession attempt. He then continued to predict that the Eastern Region would be returned to the Federation by "a police action which should take no more than a few weeks at the most."¹⁴³ Despite Gowon's statement and despite the fact there were "at least two Federal battalions and an armed reconnaissance squadron

stationed on the Eastern Region's northern frontier",¹⁴⁴ no armed confrontation occurred until well over a month after Ojukwu's declaration. The reason for the Federal delay in carrying out its public threats was simply that the Biafrans were strongly favored in terms of relative military strength as between the participants. Ojukwu was able to brag (and not without some foundation)¹⁴⁵ that he had "the biggest army in black Africa."

INITIAL BIAFRAN AGGRESSION

Surprisingly for a state proclaimed for the protection of the Ibos, it was the Biafrans and not the Federal Military Government which initiated the military confrontation. Ojukwu declared he would take military action against the Lagos government as he then proceeded to march his forces into the Midwestern Region.¹⁴⁶ Gowon had no alternative but to at least order his army to attack the East and attempt to capture Ojukwu.¹⁴⁷ At first the fears of the Federal Government appeared to be well founded for the Biafrans easily gained control of the entire Midwest. They continued on into the Western Region and soon¹⁴⁸ reached Ore which was only 135 miles east of Lagos. The Biafran offensive so far into the territory of the Federal Government certainly appeared to be incompatible with its initially declared defensive purpose.

"The common interest in minimizing the destruction of values dictates that they should not be reconstructed through intense coercion or violence."¹⁴⁹ If the Biafrans were the aggressors in this situation, then their true role in the conflict may not have been as the general world opinion has been lead to believe. As Professors McDougal and Feliciano point out in their study

entitled LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:

The appraisal of the objectives of a participant alleged to have resorted to unlawful coercion would, of course, present no difficulties if the participant explicitly and publicly declared its intention to destroy the "territorial integrity" or "political independence" of its opponent. Such open and explicit declarations, however, are bound to be rare. 150

The acts of Biafra constitute one of those rare cases if examined in the context of the conflict. They were not so blunt as some Arab governments in the Middle East are prone to be toward Israel, but soon after Biafra invaded the Midwest, Biafran leaders made public appeals to the Yorubas to "desert the federal government and the Nigerian Army and 'liberate' themselves from 151 dominion by the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups." After the Midwest had been seized, the Biafrans then publicly styled themselves as a "liberation army" and declared that their aim was "to free the Yorubas of the Western Region from domination by Northern 152 Nigerians." The fact that the Ibos struck the first military blows from a position of superiority and then made such statements while forcefully advancing into their opponent's territory clearly negates any professions that Biafra's sole raison d'être was the protection of Ibo lives. The true purpose of Biafra's creation appears as a means to join the entire South extra-juridically. The fact that the Midwest and the West contained 153 all of the remaining known petroleum reserves of Nigeria is also worthy of consideration. In the South, the fact that the Ibos would be superior in terms of military strength and population also makes their motives appear far from the pure one they would have had the world believe.

It was not surprising that the response of the West which

had already rejected the Ibo overtures in the recent political arena should be the same to a threatened military invasion by an Ibo controlled army of Biafra. While there may have been some initial wavering on the part of the West toward remaining a part of Nigeria, when it appeared that any independent Western action at the time could only lead to becoming a part of Biafra, then the decision-makers of the Yorubas threw their weight behind the Federal Government if for no other reason than simply to save themselves.

THE RESULTING FEDERAL OFFENSIVE

Federal resistance soon hardened and the superior military equipment recently received by the Lagos government began to tell on the overextended Biafran forces who had not received the support of the countryside they had expected. The tides of war changed. By September 20, 1967, Benin, the capital of the Midwest Region, was retaken by the Federal troops.¹⁵⁴ From that time to the present, the size of Biafra has been sometimes agonizingly slowly, but steadily shrinking.

Enugu, the first capital of Biafra, fell to the Federal forces in early October 1967.¹⁵⁵ To the north and west the Lagos government was in complete control. The Biafrans' one-boat "navy" had been destroyed in the first month¹⁵⁶ and a Federal blockade proved to be quite successful. In the early days of the conflict Biafra had been able to receive logistical support by land routes through the mountains to the east from Cameroon, but the Federal troops had gained control of this means of support by early October.¹⁵⁷ Because of the Federal encirclement, the only effective means of material support to Biafra was by

means of airlift. The Federal troops began an attack on Calabar on October 19, 1967. Once that was taken Biafra became entirely
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 landlocked and surrounded.

The Federal troops were not the best army by any means in
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 terms of their military efficiency, but even so by January 1, 1968, Gowon felt he could confidently give the order to his
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 governors and military commanders to end the war in three months with reasonable expectation that it would be carried out. So confident were the decision-makers in Lagos at that time that they publicly offered to cease war operations in order to "discuss and negotiate how to restore peace and heal the nations [sic]
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 wounds."

Ojukwu indicated the Biafrans' attitude when he responded at the end of January by calling for a ceasefire and "unconditional negotiations" to end the war. He stated that to continue the
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 conflict he needed mostly "money, arms, equipment and ammunition." The peace negotiations that resulted from these public offers failed because Biafrans insisted on absolute sovereignty and Nigeria on a complete return to the Federation. Despite the apparent futility of the Biafran chances for victory, the war continued to drag on.

A STALEMATE DEVELOPS

As the Federal troops advanced, they met more and more resistance the closer they came to the heart of Iboland. They responded by devoting long periods to complete inactivity despite their by now considerable numerical and material superiority in the field and complete military dominance of the air space. Both sides obviously desired peace at this stage, but all negotiations

foundered on the single point of sovereignty.

The major Biafran city of Port Harcourt fell to the Federal forces by the middle of May 1968.¹⁶³ By September the Biafran controlled territory had been reduced to approximately 5,000 square miles and its population to less than 8-million.¹⁶⁴ Even in the face of obviously insurmountable military odds and while in the throes of ever increasing starvation, the Biafrans continued to resist. The Nigerian offensive had slowed so much that for three weeks in late August and early September, the Lagos government reported it had captured Aba, yet by mid-September still had yet to show a clear victory in that battle. By February 1969, it could be stated that the "last major federal drive was September 17, 1968, at Owerri. The Second Division had not expanded its perimeter beyond Onitsha since the capture of that city March 21, 1968."¹⁶⁵

On April 1, 1969, Nigeria claimed it had begun a new drive to end the war, but on the fifth of that month it was reported that Biafran forces had halted the drive.¹⁶⁶ The administrative headquarters of Biafra, Umuhia, was captured on April 24 leaving only approximately 2,500 square miles of territory to the Biafrans, one air-strip at Uli-Ihiala and one town, Orlu.¹⁶⁷ Despite these successes, the so-called "new drive" was so ineffective that it could be reported by mid-May that the Nigerians had still made no significant progress in ten months toward the most important military objective of the war, the Biafran air-strip at Uli-Ihiala--even though this objective was the only remaining source of military and relief supplies for the encircled government.¹⁶⁸ Even more humiliating for Lagos was the fact that the Biafrans

at the end of April had recaptured Overri, formerly the fifth
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 largest city in the Eastern Region, and by the end of May had
 "rolled the Nigerians back to within 20 miles of the key oil
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 terminal city of Port Harcourt."

In addition to being able to obtain no more than a stalemate
 on the ground, the Federal Government was stunned by air raids
 on key Nigerian positions by an apparently "instant" Biafran Air
 force of four or five planes which attacked with rockets and
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 bombs commencing May 25, 1969. To fully appreciate the surprise
 of the Nigerians it should be noted that the Biafrans' "air
 force" had been considered out of operation since August 1967
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 when its sole B-26 had been destroyed.

FUTURE PROGRESS OF THE WAR

At the present time the conflict continues with no military
 resolution in sight between the combatants. The Federal forces
 have regained all the minority areas of Biafra and some of the
 Ibo territory, but they seem to be completely unable to progress
 into the heart of Iboland or even to destroy the Uli air-strip.
 The Biafran forces on the other hand, have such limited logistical
 support, such a diminished territorial base and such limited
 population resources that it is extremely unlikely they can do
 more than launch an occasional limited offensive. Regardless
 of their restricted position, the Biafrans have not given up,
 and in fact talk with a degree of realism of a war that could
 continue for five or more years. One writer was prompted to
 comment that if the conflict "were to boil down to a war of the
 wills, the Biafrans would have to be given the edge in staying
 173
 power."

STARVATION RESULTING FROM THE WAR AND RELIEF EFFORTS

Biafra had suffered steady military reverses, but even more disastrous to the nation were the deaths of substantial segments of its population due to starvation and malnutrition. This acute situation arose primarily by virtue of the complete federal encirclement and by the loss of the major food producing areas. Added to these factors was a failure to produce sufficient crops on land within Biafran control because of unusually adverse weather conditions and a disruption of productive capacity caused by wartime conditions.

It is essential to note at this point that "before the Nigerian Civil War . . . malnutrition was unknown in this part of West Africa." ¹⁷⁴ It is not the intent of this discussion to set forth in minute detail the non-combat deaths resulting from lack of proper diet as that feature has been played upon more amply in the press than can be done in the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that at times the mortality rate has reached staggering proportions which cannot be wholly dismissed without an explanation of its causes.

STARVATION AND MALNUTRITION APPEAR

By early June 1968, it became evident that substantial segments of the population of the East were suffering from the lack of a proper diet and conditions were likely to become much worse. The first food and medicines to be flown into Biafra were obtained by Ojukwu's government by means of flights from air fields in Portugal and the Portuguese islands of Sao Thome ¹⁷⁵ and Fernando Po. It soon became evident that Biafra simply did not have the means to provide adequate supplies of non-military

essentials. Lagos at first refused to recognize the fact that relief was necessary to sustain civilians. ¹⁷⁶ When all parties finally did realize the problem, it was of such magnitude that the combatants were individually unable to provide the logistical support of the war devastated areas. The International Committee of the Red Cross began landing planeloads of relief supplies in Lagos in June 1968, ¹⁷⁷ in what was to become the largest relief operation undertaken by that organization since the end of World War II. ¹⁷⁸

By mid-June it was reported that almost universally refugee children were suffering from a protein deficiency condition the Africans have named kwashiokor. In many cases the condition is fatal, but even if death does not result, it "almost always leaves its victims mentally and physically retarded." ¹⁷⁹ Once reports began to record the plight of the women and children, the Nigerians were forced to recognize the existence of the conditions and to at least make outward attempts to cooperate with the relief officials.

INITIAL RELIEF EFFORTS

Despite the fact that the need for relief efforts became increasingly acute with each passing day, each of the combatants sought to maximize his position by monopolizing on the destruction of the most important of all human values -- life itself, especially that of children. The Federal Government had military control over all air space and threatened to shoot down all unauthorized aircraft travelling into Biafra. The Federal decision-makers demanded that all relief efforts were to go through Lagos and be subjected to Nigerian control. ¹⁸⁰ Such an arrangement placed

the Biafrans in a dependent position relative to their enemies and subject to capricious acts of Lagos. Also the Federal decision-makers wanted to prevent any international acts that would reinforce Biafra's claims to sovereignty.

The Federal position could be successful only if the Biafrans were desperate enough to accept it. They did not despite the suffering of their people. Ojukwu played upon folklore and native fears to convince the civilians that the Federal authorities would poison the food under the Federal arrangement.¹⁸¹ Deaths continued and the pressure on Nigeria from the indignant world community increased. Pope Paul VI made a public statement at the Vatican on July 22, 1968, that the Catholic relief agency, Caritas, would fly aid into Biafra contrary to the Federal demands.¹⁸² The Nigerians could do little but retreat from their position. At that time the shooting down of an obviously neutral Red Cross or Caritas plane would have been a much worse alternative than allowing the relief flights.

Although both the Biafrans and the Ibo refugees in retaken Federal territory suffered the most from the lack of sufficient food and medicines, the Biafran decision-makers still sought to exploit world sympathy to promote their exclusive interests. Not only did Ojukwu refuse to accept aid channelled through Nigerian hands, he also refused to accept supplies shipped overland through Federal held territory even though nutritional experts were in agreement that such a course was the only one that would insure adequate relief.¹⁸³ Ojukwu claimed that the corridors would be used by the Federal troops to their military advantage. He insisted on an unconditional cease-fire and an airlift of food

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from outside Nigeria. When this proposal was refused by Lagos, he then refused to accept daytime airlifts by claiming that the Federal planes would "tailgate" and destroy the only remaining airstrip. 185 Such an assertion was without justifiable foundation as Federal planes had been singularly unsuccessful in destroying that strip despite their numerous attempts on its known location. Also the Nigerians had already shown they sought to avoid the adverse world opinion that would have ensued from such acts when they agreed to relief flights in the first place.

BIAFRANS LIMIT RELIEF TO CIVILIANS

The real reason for the requirement that all relief flights were to be flown only at night was to use those flights and the cover of darkness to obtain desperately needed arms. The arms flights were mingled with and became indistinguishable from the relief planes. During the week beginning September 15, 1968, it was reported that each night Biafra received a dozen relief planes and a half dozen arms shipments from fields in Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Lisbon. An average of 100 tons of food and medical supplies also yielded thirty to forty tons of arms and ammunition nightly. 186 Regardless of the military advantages to the Biafran army of such an arrangement, relief officials continued to assert that 100 tons of civilian supplies a day was not even enough to reduce the escalating death rate. A projected need of 500 tons a day was felt to be the minimum to provide a bare subsistence -- a total far beyond the capabilities of any 187 airlift under conditions at that time.

The Federal government soon realized Ojukwu's predicament and accordingly modified their original insistence on complete

control to a proposal of overland "mercy corridors" by means of which the Red Cross could truck in the large quantities of supplies needed. The offer in its final form included the provision that the supplies were to be handled exclusively by the Red Cross and the corridors would remain neutral by virtue of
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observers from members of the OAU. It could be certain that while these land routes would in all likelihood solve the situation of the civilians, it would also immeasurably aid the Nigerian military in other ways. With all civilian supplies using the land routes, any planes could be presumed to be military and subjected to attack by the Nigerian Air Force, soon drying up the already limited military capabilities of Biafra.

To avoid the sanctioning process of the world community of
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forcing acceptance of such a plan on the leaders of Biafra, the word-symbol "genocide" emerged in a Biafran attempt to shift the burden of conduct examination to the Federal Military Government. The at least temporary effectiveness of such a course of action allowed Biafra to continue as a combatant, but it was paid for in untold numbers of civilian deaths which resulted from the lack
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of adequate transportation of food and medicine.

BIAFRAN USE OF WORD SYMBOLS

An unfortunately common practice of acceptance of the use of word-symbols to depict a particular situation without further investigation or definition in light of the underlying motives is always at best a superficial and dangerous course of action. Ojukwu had resorted to such emotionally descriptive practices many times in attempts to maximize the values Biafrans sought to achieve. The characterization of Biafra as an "Ibo state" was

incorrect when it is realized that more than one-third of its population was non-Ibo. Another instance of this practice was in the declaration that Biafra was established to protect the Ibos from the violent acts of the other Nigerians. Then less than six weeks after Biafra declared its independence, it clearly assumed the role of an aggressor against the Yoruba region of Nigeria claiming to be the "liberator" of those "oppressed" by the North. The circumstances of the eventual defeat of Ojukwu's forces in the West and Midwest clearly indicated just how much "liberation" those peoples sought.

The use of the word-symbol genocide was doubly appropriate for the Biafrans' purposes. In the first place genocide had the tremendous connotations resulting from the tragic deaths of the Jews in Nazi Germany and secondly the Ibos had continually sought to portray themselves in the context of the Nigerian equivalent of the "Jewish people". While in the minds of some anthropologists such as Basden, the Ibos may be descended from Hebrew stock, there is actually only slight evidence of such a fact and little support from other authorities. The Ibos had been spread throughout Nigeria, but they had neither the historical origins nor the magnitude of the Jewish Diaspora no matter how much they sought to culturally identify themselves with those practicing the Jewish religion. There was a striking similarity between the Ibo claims to continued tribal affiliation regardless of Nigerian residence and the Zionist appeals of present day Israel to be the "national home of all Jewish people."

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No matter where the Ibos went throughout the country, they formed unions and every member was required to pay dues in

addition to "special subscriptions" -- really taxes to advance¹⁹³
 the Ibo position in the Nigerian community. When Ojukwu issued
 his call to all Ibos to return to Iboland, he was in a sense
 establishing a "national home" for the Ibos. As Ojukwu is
 reportedly an avid student of Israel¹⁹⁴ it was undoubtedly no
 accident when the leaders of Biafra sought to identify their
 case with "the Israelis who [sic] we admire."¹⁹⁵

Obviously Biafra employed the word-symbol genocide to preserve
 its independence and to strengthen its appeal in the world
 community. In so doing it sought to obscure the fact that most
 of the civilian deaths from lack of adequate relief supplies was
 the result of the Biafran decision-makers intransigence. The
 appeal to anti-Nazi and Jewish sentiment in the same manner as
 the highly successful Zionists have done was meant to replace
 emotionally charged words for actual facts.¹⁹⁶

ANALYSIS OF GENOCIDE CLAIMS

In the actual context of Nigeria, genocide was an unsupportable
 claim on two levels because: (1) juridically it was nationally a
non sequitur; and (2) actual investigations by independent
 international observer teams exonerated Nigeria's military conduct
 in the war zones.

The word genocide was first applied to describe the attempted¹⁹⁷
 extermination of the Jews by Nazi Germany and can be described
 as "probably the most tragic event of the present century. All
 moral individuals of whatever national or religious identification
 share revulsion at those who perpetrated these crimes."¹⁹⁸ The
 most comprehensive definition of genocide is found in Article II
 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime

of Genocide which was unanimously adopted by the United Nations
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 General Assembly December 9, 1949. For the present purposes,
 however, it may be more simply described as "the deliberate
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 destruction of national, religious or ethnic groups."

A typical example of the statements made by the proponents
 of the genocide claims was such as follows:

We are all aware that the Nigerian armies which have
 encircled the Ibo heartlands are heavily armed with British
 and Russian weapons. But it can hardly be doubted, in view
 of the reports from the war front, that they are also strongly
 armed with the conviction of fanatics, that as they kill
Biafrans, they are destroying a human "cancer" which they
describe by the term "Ibo." 201 (emphasis added)

The italicized portions of this statement demonstrate how the
 genocide claimants often used the terms "Biafran" and "Ibo"
 synonymously to describe the victims of the alleged deliberate
 destruction. Although the major tribe of the region was the
 Ibo, it has been noted that Biafra was also the homeland of many
 minority tribes. Regardless of the claim that the victims of
 the alleged genocide were Biafrans, no claim was ever made that
 the Federal Government intended to destroy the minorities. That
 was because any foundation for the genocide claims had to rest
 upon the precession discrimination and riots which had been
 against the Ibos only. There could have been no historical
 support for the entire Biafran nation which included non-Ibo
 segments. Therefore, the claims of genocide against Biafrans
 was simply due to imprecise language and unclear perception of
 the facts by those who thought in such terms.

VALIDITY OF GENOCIDE CLAIMS AS APPLIED TO NON-BIAFRAN IBOS

If genocide was being practiced, then it must have been with
 the intent to destroy in whole or in part the Ibo people as a

group. It then became necessary to discover if it was the whole or only a part of the Ibos who were in danger and if it was not the whole then to identify the part. The position of the Ibos in the Federal territory refuted any basis for the charge that it was the Ibos as a whole who were the subject of genocide by the Lagos government.

After the atrocities in the fall of 1966 when Ojukwu issued his call for all Ibos to return to their homeland, an estimated two million responded. One very important fact that was ignored or simply overlooked by the genocide claimants was the fact that not all Ibos "returned" to the East. Many remained where they had made their homes in the various parts of Nigeria. If the group that was threatened was to be adequately defined then it was necessary to examine the treatment of the non-Biafran Ibos who were the most subject to Nigerian control.

In October 1968, United States Senator Edward W. Brooke stated on the basis of his own personal knowledge that "there are more than 38,000 Ibos living in Lagos itself at the present time; they are well, prosperous, and unharmed. There are Ibos serving in the Government of Nigeria, one of the foremost of whom is in fact the Nigerian Ambassador to the United States." 202 Another reliable source pointed out that there were millions of Ibos in the non-Eastern sections of the country, over one-half million in the Midwest alone. They were allowed to go about their normal business, even in such places as the Northern city of Kano where the worst anti-Ibo riots had occurred. 203 An Ibo of cabinet rank was on the staff of the Governor of Kano in charge of "all the property of the Ibo people and others who left Kano

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in the disturbances." There were a considerable number of Ibos in the Federal Government such as: 642 Ibo police officers in the Nigerian police force; the permanent Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Industries was an Ibo; another was the Executive secretary of the Federal Inland Revenue Department. In addition, the Nigerian Ambassadors to Belgium and India were also Ibos. The Nigerians had also established a "considerable department . . . headed by senior Ibo officials, to devise plans for reincorporation of the Ibos of the reconquered areas."

These facts quite clearly indicated that genocide was obviously not the practice of the Federal Government against the Ibos who remained in the Federal territory. Thus, if not all of the Ibos were in danger, it could have been only the part which was the Ibo population of Biafra who were the subjects of genocide. Yet this area was by definition subject to the exclusive control of the Biafran decision-makers and it was physically impossible for the Nigerians to carry out a systematic program of destruction against those people.

REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER TEAMS

The one area in which genocide against Biafran Ibos could be practiced was in those areas of Biafra taken by the Federal army. Because the claim of genocide had been so often made in the world arena, the Federal Government in September 1968, invited representatives of the United Nations Secretary General, the Organization of African Unity, Britain, Canada, Poland, and Sweden to observe in person the military operations and refugee treatment by the Nigerian armed forces. The members of these inspection teams subsequently filed reports covering different

sections of the territory recaptured by the Federal forces.

The first report, filed by Major General Henry Alexander of the United Kingdom, Major General W.A. Milroy of Canada and Major General Arthur Raab of Sweden, dated October 2, 1968, was typical of all subsequent reports. The observers reported that they had visited with no restrictions of any sort to their movements or investigations, "front line positions, military units and headquarters, villages, market places, medical and food distributing stations, refugee camps and major cities and towns." The observers "talked to officers, soldiers, local inhabitants, refugees, members of the civil Administration, Police, Red Cross officials and missionaries." The summary of the findings of this first report was that "[t]here is no evidence of any intent by the Federal troops to destroy the Ibo people or their property, and the use of the term genocide is in no way justified."

A second report by the observer team which included Mr. Neils Gussing of the United Nations, Colonel Alfons Olkiewicz of Poland and representatives of the Organization of African Unity was filed regarding observations during the period from October 5 through 10, 1968. This report summarized:

There is no evidence supporting the allegation of genocide by Federal forces against the Ibo people. There are a number of Ibo people alive and well behind the Federal lines. This speaks for itself. However the majority of the Ibos who lived in the area have not yet returned.

A third report was filed by the members of the observation team comprised of representatives from Canada, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom covering the period from October 15 to 18, with regard to observations of the retaken Ibo areas west of the

Niger River. This report concluded: "We did not see or hear any
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 evidence of genocide."

FAILURE OF GENOCIDE CLAIMS DOES NOT END WAR

When information regarding the conditions of non-Biafran
 Ibos and the results of the observer teams' reports were
 published to refute Ojukwu's claims of genocide and the emotions
 it at least temporarily evoked, the actions of the Biafran
 decision-makers could no longer be covered by that convenient
 word symbol. Nigeria periodically offered to allow daylight relief
 flights and the use of land corridors under neutral observation.
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 Relief officials and impartial foreign observers continually
 insisted that the only means of providing adequate relief to
 the starving within Biafra could be accomplished by the means
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 suggested by the Federal officials.

If in fact the plight of the Biafran people was so terrible,
 and the claims of genocide were not true, then the question that
 must be asked is why did those people not act through their
 institutions to replace the decision-makers who were pursuing
 such a destructive course and then seek to end the conflict?
 It is submitted that the combatants would have reached a settle-
 ment long ago by which Biafra would have again become an integral
 part of Nigeria except for two distinct but interrelated factors.
 One reason for the continued resistance of the Biafran peoples
 is that while there may have been no validity to the claims of
 genocide, the unnecessary destruction of human values by both
 sides, especially the Federal forces, created an attitude among
 the Biafrans as expressed by Sir Louis Mbanefo when he said:
 "We are totally committed. If extermination is the price we have

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to pay, then we cannot escape it." A second reason is that there are many non-combatant participants also engaged in this conflict. These participants are seeking to maximize their own values with little or no regard for the destruction of the values of the combatants.

ATROCITIES OF THE COMBATANTS CONTRIBUTING TO CONTINUATION OF THE
ARMED CONFLICT

Soon after the actual armed conflict commenced, the International Committee of the Red Cross reported that both sides "gave assurances of a desire to respect the Geneva Conventions protecting war victims." ²¹⁶ Despite such professions of their intent to adhere to the "rules of war", both sides in this war, as is generally true in any war, did not sufficiently restrain their actions. There were many cruel attacks not only on opposing troops, ²¹⁷ but also on the civilians who according to one Federal Army Commander "are neutral. They just want to be left alone. They have realized that in all the battles eventually they are ²¹⁸ the only victims."

One writer caustically remarked that:

In truth this was very much an African war in which 'genocide is seldom the main motive, but often the ultimate result. Traditionally, the victor in an African war did what was expected by both sides: he looted everything that could be carried, burned the rest, and killed all the able bodied men and frequently the women and children too.

The Nigerian war is being fought instinctively within this traditional framework and with all the modern weapons 219

Such an indictment may be unduly critical of the combatants and the generalization of African concepts of war unfair in the light of the conduct in many non-African wars, but at times it seemed as if both combatants were attempting to validate just such a

statement.

CONDUCT OF ARMIES OF COMBATANTS

When the Biafran troops were forced to withdraw from the Midwest, an eyewitness reported: "Those who resisted [Biafran military appropriation of food from the marketplace] were shot on the spot and Biafran troops left behind them the bodies of hundreds of marketwomen sprawled in front of their stalls." 220

That the conduct of the Federal troops was not better is illustrated by an example related by a Catholic priest, Brother Aloysius, regarding his personal experiences:

In the hospital outside Enugu, they [the Nigerian troops] shot all 14 Biafran nurses who stayed behind, then went down the wards killing the patients as well. It was the same thing at Port Harcourt. 221

Of course such recitals could possibly be dismissed as only isolated instances, but there have been such an enormous number of accounts of similar acts by the military of both sides that the above can only be classified as typical examples.

DIMINISHED VIOLATIONS BY THE ARMIES

Had the relative strengths and the power bases of the combatants remained essentially equal, all indications are that both sides would have continued their atrocities against both civilian and military victims. Such was not to be the case however, as the Biafrans were forced into a position almost completely devoted to defending Biafran people. The Federal troops although on the offensive (and at least occasionally advancing) were later subjected to the close scrutiny of the observer teams. These teams were a strong restraining force on the actions of the troops as their behavior was constantly

subjected to observation and reports. It was generally noted that the behavior of the Federal troops was not as exemplary as it should have been,²²² but public observation brought about summary punishment for at least the gross misconduct in the field.²²³

With the resultant decrease of atrocities by the armies of both sides, the steady shrinking of Biafra, the starvation, and the general refutation of the claims of genocide, peace prospects favored the Federal Military Government. The first part of calendar year 1969 should have seen the Biafran decision-makers either accepting the best possible peace terms they could obtain or their replacement by a dissatisfied Biafran people. A settlement did not occur largely because of the inexcusable actions of the Nigerian Air Force.

CIVILIAN BOMBINGS BY NIGERIAN AIR FORCE

From the time of their loss of their only plane until April 1969, the Biafrans had no military air capabilities. The Federal forces on the other hand, had received large numbers of MIG fighters and Ilushin bombers from the Soviets who also "allowed" Egypt to provide trained pilots to operate these aircraft.²²⁴

Unfortunately for both sides the Nigerian Air Force did not, or was not able to, restrict its pilots to attacks on essentially military targets. In the early stages of the conflict, attacks were made on civilian targets in both Iboland and the minority areas of Biafra. At the time of secession the Federal Government had hoped that the minority tribes would form a fifth column in Biafra, but the result of the indiscriminate air attacks was to make the minorities fear both sides. Their lack of assistance to Lagos then required a much greater Federal effort to win back

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even the non-Ibo areas of Biafra. The Nigerians should have recognized the fact that non-essential destruction of values in war inversely affects the amount of military effort required to obtain any objectives. If they did not realize such a principle before, then they should have learned it from the Biafra minority experience.

Instead, commencing in early 1969, the Nigerian Air Force greatly increased its attacks on the civilian population within Biafra. These attacks gave considerable credence to the claims that Nigeria sought the destruction of the Ibos even if the rebel decision-makers should have sought peace and also revived the spector of genocide once again, at least in the eyes of the Biafran people.

On February 7, 1969, about noon, a Nigerian fighter-bomber bombed and strafed a market place in the Biafran village of Umuchiagu; 200 to 300 civilians were killed. Another bomb was 226
dropped on a maternity clinic killing fifteen women and children. In another example of these senseless air raids, on February 24, 1969, Federal planes bombed a well marked Red Cross hospital, a 227
market place, a clinic for convalescents and a Red Cross vehicle. One other example of the type of attacks that were carried out occurred on February 26, 1969, when a Nigerian Ilushin attacked the market in the Biafran village of Ozu-Aban which was located at least fifteen miles from the front lines of the war. A 228
minimum of 120 civilians were killed, mostly women and children.

These examples are cited only to illustrate the general character of the bombings which occurred day after day in the first months of 1969. All the while the vital Uli air strip

continued to function nightly, as it had only received negligible damage from Nigerian planes during the same period. 229

Had a concentrated effort been directed at this target, no arms or supplies could have arrived in Biafra. Then the Biafrans would have been forced at the very least to accept the more effective relief corridors. Instead, the air attacks on civilians destroyed much of the world sympathy for the Federal cause, threatened the Nigerian military supplies from Great Britain, and of most importance, the bombings reinforced the Biafrans' determination to continue to resist despite the overwhelming odds against them. 230

General Gowon initially denied that any attacks had been carried out against civilians--perhaps because he was powerless to stop the Egyptian pilots. But it was a matter that could not be concealed and comments appeared such as this excerpt from an editorial in the New York Times:

There is no doubt that the Egyptian mercenaries flying soviet planes go deliberately for the congested village markets, town centers, and the Red Cross symbol on hospitals and aid stations while meticulously avoiding defended Biafran military targets. 231

The British Parliament threatened to stop all its military aid to the Nigerian Government because of the bombings. United States President Nixon sent Professor C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr., to investigate the conduct of the war and the prospects for peace. Professor Ferguson visited both Biafra and Nigeria and clearly analyzed the results of Nigeria's bombings when he commented as follows:

A tremendous determination has been made to live or die together. Most of this, I think, can be attributed to the bombing. In speaking to a number of persons, it was apparent

that this has been the one factor more than anything else, that has given an extraordinary kind of unity. 232

General Gowon finally conceded on March 31, 1969, that "some" civilian targets in Biafra had been hit "by error" and "numbers of civilians killed," but he concluded that the air attacks would continue as long as they "were militarily useful." 233 Since that time, the air attacks on civilian targets have decreased, but the psychological results created have been disastrous to peace efforts: not only in terms of lives destroyed by the raids, but even more important in creating among those surviving Biafrans such a suspicion of Nigerian motives that any peace proposals which offer less than complete independence are categorically rejected. Mainly because of the bombings it is most likely that the Biafran decision-makers will continue to resist as long as they have the slightest means and in so doing they will continue to have the support of their people.

IV. THE ROLES OF THE NON-COMBATANT PARTICIPANTS

The second major reason for the continuation of the war in Nigeria is the fact that while the actual fighting is being done by individuals of Biafra and Nigeria with the assistance of some few mercenaries, many other nations, either individually or in groups, seeking to maximize their own values have become participants in the conflict through their support for one side or the other. The ultimate result of their intervention has been to destroy in large part the well-being, wealth, power, respect and enlightenment of the people of Nigeria.

MULTINATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS PARTICIPANTS

Several multinational organizations have in varying degrees

either attempted to, or have been called upon, to intercede between the combatants while others have limited their participation solely to relief efforts. While it cannot be said they have had no effect on the course of the war, the efforts to achieve a peaceful solution and a return to a "one Nigeria" have singularly failed to provide a solution.

UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

The United Nations through UNESCO and the International Committee of the Red Cross have limited their participation in the conflict to that of attempting to provide relief to the refugees and wounded who are the ultimate products of the war. The United Nations has been called upon several times to play a larger role to attempt to achieve peace, but Secretary General U Thant has publicly stated that his position on Biafra "is guided by the Organization of African Unity, and will continue to be." ²³⁴ To this date he has followed that policy and the United Nations has not expanded its role to include that of a peace maker.

The International Committee of the Red Cross has acted solely as a humanitarian organization and throughout the conflict has remained scrupulously neutral as is necessary to its effective operation. It has solely devoted its efforts toward attempting to maintain the well-being of all individuals to the best of its ability by providing relief. The contribution by these organizations has been to reduce the level of warfare and destruction of human values by decreasing the degree of animosity between the combatants, aiding those suffering from war, and by providing an impartial objective arbiter to weigh the claims of the combatants relating to conduct of the war.

COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

Nigeria is a member of both the Commonwealth of Nations and of the Organization of African Unity. Biafra actively sought membership in both of these organizations, but so far has been unsuccessful in becoming admitted to either. Both of these associations represent multinational efforts to achieve common values of their members through a mutual institution. Neither has purported to replace the United Nations, but each acts as a supplement in which the interests of its individual states are presumed more similar. Members of both the Commonwealth and of the OAU have had an inclusive interest in settling the present civil war and have been active advocates of a peaceful solution.

The Commonwealth of Nations was established in 1965 on the voluntary association of former British colonies throughout the world. It includes among its twenty-eight members ten independent states of black Africa, but it has not proven to be a particularly successful association in the eyes of those Africans. Regardless of the more cosmopolitan appeal of the Commonwealth, the primary Western power in black Africa has been France through its fourteen member Communal African and Malagasy Organization. 235 If the Commonwealth could have obtained a peaceful settlement of a civil war in one of its African members, it would have gained much of the African respect it was lacking by virtue of Britain's former colonial association with white racist Rhodesia and South Africa.

The Commonwealth Secretary General, Arnold Smith of Canada, arranged a peace conference between the combatants to be held at Kampala, Uganda, in the late spring of 1968, and also offered to

raise a peace force to observe any ceasefire between the opposing
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 armies. After these discussions were completed, neither of
 the combatants had retreated from its original position. Nothing
 permanent was accomplished by the Commonwealth and it has now
 essentially retreated from the arena.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has played a much
 more active role in attempting to resolve the war, but to date
 the results of its efforts have also been negligible. This
 regional institution was created for the purpose of promoting
 in the world community a unified effort of the independent
 African nations. These states have sought to maximize their values
 in a region endowed with vast human and natural resources, but
 lacking a population enlightened in European concepts or possessed
 of adequate skills to exploit their natural assets. Most of the
 colonial forms of government have been withdrawn, but many
 powerful residual effects remain. The purpose of the OAU is to
 promote the (at times impatient) goals of Africans within a frame-
 work created by colonial powers in a world still largely dominated
 by those powers.

At stake in the Biafran conflict for the OAU was its own unity.
 Any positive results could not but help this organization which
 has so far been largely ineffectual in obtaining its declared
 objectives. The attack of the Nigerian civil war on the OAU was
 even more basic, for what was happening in Nigeria was also a
 threat very real to many of its other members. Really at stake
 was an old principle with a new meaning -- the right to self-
 determination. The African states had only won their first
 round when they gained independence from the colonial powers.

Now they were facing a second: namely the demands of the many ethnic groups of Africa to shape their own institutions without being inflexibly bound to the maintenance of the territorial integrity created by the Europeans in order to maximize European wealth.²³⁷ Some of the members of the OAU who are burdened with tribal imbalances similar to Nigeria's, or whose tribes are split by European drawn frontiers, include Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya and the Sudan, Ruanda and Burundi, Cameroun and Dahomey, Uganda,²³⁸ Zambia, Mauretania and Togoland.

It was in the interests of each of the members of the OAU to maintain the status quo as their individual and collective existence depended upon it. Then it was not unexpected that with the Congo still fresh in their minds, all OAU members initially voted to condemn the Biafran secession. The resolution expressed "trust and confidence" in the Federal Government of Nigeria and vowed to send a top level mission to Lagos to assure the government of the OAU's desire for "the territorial integrity,²³⁹ unity and peace of Nigeria."

The first OAU efforts to resolve the conflict were based on the premise that peace could only be achieved if the East renounced its secession. This one-sided approach caused Biafran decision-makers to denounce the initial OAU peace efforts as²⁴⁰ "stage managed." This out-of-hand rejection by Biafra of OAU proposals indicated Ojukwu did not fear sanctions the OAU might be able to impose. Biafra was already encircled and being subjected to the almost maximum coercion that could be imposed by Africans. Only one direction was left for the OAU if its name was to be more than symbolic.

The members of the OAU soon began to foresee even more immediate and serious problems confronting them, especially in those countries neighboring Nigeria. The possibility of other internal eruptions had an effect on their business climate which needed substantial outside investment. The war was felt to reflect adversely on the degree of political stability and enlightenment in black Africa. Finally, it reinforced the position of the often condemned white racist elements of South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories who have continually maintained that native Africans are not ready for self-rule. In response to these pressures which continued to grow, the OAU softened its original position so that by September 1968, it adopted a resolution calling for "a cessation of hostilities and general amnesty for all who took up arms in the Biafran cause." ²⁴¹ (emphasis added)

Despite its change of attitude, the OAU has remained unsuccessful in achieving any progress toward a solution. It has no sanctions it may employ against Biafra. Any that it may be able to use to force Lagos to accept less than a form of united Nigeria would only be to subvert the power of the decision-makers of the OAU's constituent states by encouraging tribalism.

PARTICIPATION BY NON-COMBATANT NATION-STATES

Any major event in one nation has some import in other states in the world community, its extent primarily dependent upon the degree of mutual expectations shared by individuals of those states. These persons in turn through their political institutions are constantly seeking to maximize their base values, thus creating interaction between government institutions. The Biafran conflict is no exception and the role of participant

nations other than the combatants ranges on a continuum from incidental passive hardship to considered, active contributions of military supplies to combatants to conduct the war.

PASSIVE PARTICIPANTS

An extreme example of the extensive effects of the Nigerian civil war on other nations in the world can be illustrated by the case of Iceland. By December 1967, Iceland began to suffer from a severe economic crisis resulting from a variety of causes. One of the major factors contributing to her financial difficulty was the fact that Iceland's major export is stockfish and the Eastern Region of Nigeria had previously purchased large quantities of this commodity. The Nigerian blockade of the coast in the early days of the war prevented the delivery and sale of a large part of Iceland's annual autumn shipments of dried cod. New markets were not immediately available and substantial foreign exchange was lost.

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Other countries not actively involved in the outcome initially benefited from the war such as Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Italy and the Netherlands whose citizens derived economic benefits from the private sales of arms to the belligerents. When the war had continued for more than a year without an end definitely in sight, and combined with the large losses of human life, the wealth received from these arms sales became of lesser importance than the destruction these arms caused. One by one each of these countries ceased its supply to the combatants by the revocation of export licenses. By August 1968, only those participants actively interested in the outcome of the conflict remained as the sources of military supplies.

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Other passive participants in the war consisted of the majority of the members of the Organization of African Unity who although they had considerable interest in the outcome of the conflict, restricted their participation solely to resolutions within the OAU and supported the attempts to resolve the conflict by that organization. Their total active participation in contributing to the level of combat has been very limited -- only the dubious contribution to Biafra resulting from formal recognition by four African states and the more valuable use of airfields in Gabon and the Ivory Coast for military supplies to Biafra. 244

No African nation has provided arms, men, supplies or economic assistance to bolster the armies of either of the combatants. Unfortunately for the combatants such a "hands off" attitude is not uniformly the case of nations outside the African continent. With good justification there has been a continually growing resentment on the part of black African leaders with regard to participation by non-African nations without whose active support the civil war in Nigeria could never have obtained either the magnitude or the duration which it has achieved.

ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS

UNITED STATES. The assignment of categories creates arbitrary distinctions that are unduly pronounced in the marginal areas. The role of the United States of America in the present conflict is just such a case. While it has made no secret of its attitude supporting the proposition of "one Nigeria", it has not contributed any military materials to either combatant, nor has it allowed any export licenses for arms sales from private individuals to Nigeria or Biafra. 245 Such a position is especially commendable

when it is considered that before the war, the United States supplied about 16 per cent of all Nigerian imports and had committed (and spent) \$225-million on Nigerian development, more than has been given to any other African state. The only official United States participation in the actual conflict has been limited to "fact finding" missions of government officials and members of Congress visited upon the decision-makers of both sides.

What makes the United States an active participant in the Nigerian arena is its involvement in the relief efforts conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Joint Church Aid. Individuals in the United States have contributed \$10-million since the beginning of the relief effort, and government contributions have now reached \$65-million. This total of \$75-million has amounted to 49 per cent of all expenses of the international relief efforts in Nigeria and Biafra. United States attempts at settlement of the differences between the combatants have been restricted almost exclusively to attempts to expedite the delivery of necessary supplies to alleviate the suffering of the civilian victims of the war. Simply by virtue of its enormous financial contributions, its position in the world community, and its presence in relief negotiations the United States does fall into the class of active participant.

Other nations have not so restricted themselves and their actions bear a striking resemblance to the earlier colonial competition and involvement which exploited both African lives and wealth regardless of the damage done to the native resources. In reality, it was not long before the conflict assumed

proportions much larger than a civil war. The combatants received support from the same powers that had competed for the same territory in earlier times. The only exception to this statement must be the addition of one new non-African world power to the West African arena -- the Soviet Union.

PORTUGUAL. Only one day after he proclaimed Biafra's secession, Ojukwu stated he would "deal with the devil if necessary" to insure Biafra's survival. As Africa's oldest surviving colonial enemy, Portugal most accurately fits that description. Portugal was the first and only European country at the outbreak of the combat to offer Biafra telecommunication facilities and landing rights for the airlift of supplies. ²⁴⁸ Soon there were eight transport aircraft flying from Lisbon to Biafra about which the Portuguese government would only state it knew of "foreign aircraft transporting foreign goods . . . [but Portugal] has nothing to do with it." ²⁴⁹ The veracity of such a statement is highly questionable when it is considered that whatever the ultimate outcome, open warfare in Nigeria--the longer the better--could not help but assist the Portuguese interests in Africa. It would to a large degree remove the strong pressures put on Portugal to grant her African colonies independence, as it would create some diversion of publicity from Portuguese colonies. It would also give Portugal substantial verbal ammunition against the ever-present African nationalistic movements of which Nigeria was one of its strongest advocates on that continent. Unfortunately for Ojukwu, the Portuguese intention was not to create another new African independent state to ultimately oppose its policies, but simply to destroy an existing Nigeria.

Just as in the days of slave trading, Portugal was playing Africans against Africans in order to maximize Portuguese goals. GREAT BRITAIN. At least on the surface Nigeria was in much more satisfactory company with regard to her external sources of support. Not only were her active supporters motivated toward the end of "one Nigeria", but there were two major sources of supply competing against each other in a manner which ensured to Nigeria's material benefit.

Britain maintained that she had always been Nigeria's "traditional supplier" of military equipment and that she would continue a supply of "traditional" arms. There was some truth in such a statement, but from 1964 until the outbreak of hostilities. Britain's only military supplies to Nigeria had consisted solely of armored cars and ceremonial uniforms.²⁵⁰ Initially Britain allowed more substantial assistance than that in the form of anti-aircraft guns, rifles and boats, but it flatly rejected²⁵¹ Nigerian requests for a squadron of fighter aircraft. Subsequently Britain increased the nature of her military assistance to include large quantities of modern military equipment for ground warfare, but steadfastly refused to provide any sort of offensive aircraft.

One of Britain's most obvious reasons for supporting Nigeria was that she had created the country from diverse tribal areas and "Britain had long hoped that Nigeria would be a prosperous and influential force in Africa."²⁵² If Nigeria foundered because of the civil war, it would constitute another ghost to haunt a now already second-class Britain. The resultant loss of respect caused by Nigerian failure would reflect even more damage on the

already wounded British pride.

In addition to respect, another major reason for British support of Nigeria was economic. Britain is the largest foreign investor in Nigerian industry and Nigeria is a dependent importer of British goods. Any disruption of the Federation could only adversely affect the precarious wealth of Britain. The ever increasing importance of Nigerian petroleum is one example. Shortly after the outbreak of the war Biafra threatened to nationalize all assets of foreign businesses that continued to deal with Nigeria. The British would have lost approximately ²⁵³ \$240-million by such a move in the former Eastern Region.

As long as Britain supported Nigeria she could be certain of retaining her Nigerian assets and possibly regaining those in Biafra. If she supported Biafra in any way she could be certain of losing her Nigerian assets without the benefit of any concrete assurances from Biafra. Finally, by selling arms to Nigeria Britain increased an already strong economic dependency. If she refused to sell, arms would be purchased elsewhere and British ties would be only weakened.

SOVIET UNION. When Britain refused to sell aircraft, a new, non-colonial power, yet one very steeped in the observance of traditional rules to obtain its own neo-colonial economic values, immediately filled the Nigerian request. By mid-August 1967, the Federal Government had received at Kano six MIG-17 fighters, four or five Czech L-29 jet trainers and 20 Ilushin-28 bombers, complete ²⁵⁴ with armament and Soviet military experts. The Russian terms were quite generous: the MIGs were obtained in exchange for 7,000 tons of cocoa and the bombers were "on loan" from the

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United Arab Republic. And so the USSR became a most unwelcome bedfellow of Great Britain in supporting the Nigerian cause.

One writer has stated:

Whatever its explanation for the record, Moscow's ulterior motive for supplying Lagos with MIG's, torpedo boats and more than 200 "technicians" was apparent from the start. Once again, Moscow was trying to gain a foothold on a continent where past power plays had produced an almost unbroken chain of failures. 256

Soon after Nigerian receipt of the Russian aircraft a Federal owned radio station broadcast:

Ironically enough, it was one of the nations which Nigeria used to treat with fear and suspicion that has turned out to be her greatest friend in her most trying hours. This nation is the Soviet Union. 257

The Soviet military aid opened a door which then led to the conclusion of a \$140-million economic and technical assistance agreement signed in Lagos in November 1968. 258

Not only had the Soviets achieved a substantial position in Africa by virtue of the Nigerian assistance, but what made the Soviet victory twice as sweet was the complete change of previous Nigerian policy toward the communist countries. Nigeria had deliberately delayed the establishment of relations with the Soviet Union; imposed restrictions on the size of the Soviet mission in Lagos; restricted travel to the Soviet-bloc; limited the importation of communist literature; discouraged Soviet-bloc aid and trade; had proposed a "two-China" policy and supported India in her dispute with China; had concluded a defense pact with Britain; permitted the establishment of a secret NATO radio station in Nigeria; and cooperated with American space programs; had refused to attend the Belgrade Conference of Non-aligned Nations; and had adopted a policy of silence, or

worse, on Cuba, Berlin, and the resumption of United States
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nuclear tests, to cite some examples.

Not only did Moscow provide substantial military assistance, but it also complicated the British position by removing the threat of British sanctions if Nigeria was not felt in the eyes of London to be conducting the war properly. Britain could no longer threaten to withdraw her military support. If she did so, Russia was more than willing to fill the gap and so Nigeria would lean even more toward the east.

EGYPT. The Russian support also brought aid from Nasser who took his cue from Moscow. Another reason for Egyptian participation has been suggested as a factor: "The principal leaders in Lagos were fellow Moslems and the Ibos were not only Christians, but had openly identified their cause with Israel's struggle to create
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a homeland." Such a statement may at first seem far-fetched, yet the pilots of the Nigerian Air Force planes which indiscriminately bombed Biafran civilians, were almost exclusively Egyptians.

FRANCE. It seems impossible that Biafra could have withstood the power alignment behind the Nigerian military effort when her Portuguese support was so weak. That situation was the case when by August 1968, Biafran equipment and morale had reached its lowest point. General Gowon could justifiably be confident when he again gave one of his many victory predictions. He would not have been so assured if he had known that another old colonial power, France, had quietly entered the West African arena again on behalf of Biafra.

At first France gave Biafra a modest injection of foreign currency to buy vitally needed arms and ammunition. Then she

began underwriting the costs of ferrying in the military supplies. Soon French financial and military aid began to increase and by September 1968, three to four flights of French arms began to arrive nightly at the Uli air strip from French speaking Gabon and the Ivory Coast. Although the French refused to openly acknowledge their role, it has been called "one of the worst kept secrets of the war"²⁶² and was quite universally reported. The French not only began to fulfill the Biafran's material military needs, but at least equally important, she openly declared support for the Biafran cause.

The formal recognition of Biafra by other relatively unimportant nations in the world arena had only a slight effect when compared to a statement by Charles De Gualle on July 31, 1968, that:

The [French] Government notes that the bloodshed and suffering endured by the peoples of Biafra for more than a year show their will to affirm themselves as a people. Faithful to this principle, the French Government believes that, as a result, the present conflict should be resolved on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination 263

France has never accorded Biafra formal recognition, but the boost to Ojukwu's government was tremendous. The impact on the peace talks scheduled for Addis Ababa on August 5, was²⁶⁴ disastrous. Not only were the hopes for settlement dashed, but so were Nigerian hopes of military success. The "final push" of September 1968 was blunted because of French support. The Biafrans regained the town of Uli and captured two oil wells to the south. If those petroleum sources had not been captured, it was estimated that Biafra's fuel stocks would have been depleted²⁶⁵ in weeks. With the French support, the military situation has been able to remain relatively static to this date and there is little prospect of change.

The reason for France's untimely action is not as evident as the other active participants. One person in Africa is reported to have stated that it "was to spite the British, who are backing Nigeria, to spite the Americans, and because they want to show off their muscle in Africa and take on the role of the protectors of the persecuted." ²⁶⁶ Enigmatic as the French actions sometimes seem to be, it is unlikely that their presence in Biafra is merely for spite.

The general consensus of opinion among journalists is that "French-subsidized oil interests could gain a major share of Britain's oil concessions if Biafra wins." ²⁶⁷ There may be some truth to these charges, but it should be noted that France's support did not come until virtually all of the petroleum producing areas had been lost by Biafra. A much more logical time to intervene would have been upon the declaration of secession or any time before Biafra's position became so limited. If the French intention was to create an offensive force in Biafra which would regain the production areas, that intent could not be inferred from the military assistance given which consisted almost entirely of bolt action rifles and ammunition ²⁶⁸ -- hardly sufficient for a major Biafran offensive against their well equipped opponents. Only if Biafra were able to resist long enough to force a settlement which will include sovereignty over many non-Ibo lands would the French gain from such a motive.

The most likely reason for France's support of the rebels is that if the war continues long enough world opinion will force Nigeria to accept some sort of very loose federation of its major tribal areas. A massive Nigeria has then been prevented

from becoming a dominant power to lead West African nations replacing the now almost colonial control France still holds in some of those countries. What French policy will be without the leadership of Charles De Gaulle remains an open question, but no change in French Biafran policy has been observed yet.

V. CONCLUSION

The cost of the war in Nigeria has been tremendous relative to the size of the country both in its economic effect and in terms of the destruction of human lives. The Federal Government has lost primarily in terms of material values and the East in the well-being of its people.

In one and one-half years of war, Nigeria's reserves have been reduced from £ 75-million to £ 36-million; a substantial amount when the 1966 gross national product was only \$14.5-billion. Much needed capital inflow dropped \$18-million in 1966 alone because of the internal conflict and the country's growth rate that year declined from 5.6 per cent to roughly 3 per cent. At the beginning of the calendar year 1969, the total cost of the war in damage and loss of business opportunities to Nigeria was estimated at approximately \$960-million. Approximately \$240-million alone will be required to repair the damage to public facilities alone. In addition, Nigeria's six year national development plan has fallen at least three years behind schedule.

The economic loss to the Biafrans, while impossible to calculate at this time, is of only minor importance when compared to the enormous destruction of human lives and the permanent damage to many of its next generation who might survive. 125,000 deaths from starvation per month is a pitiful indictment

of the system of maintaining public order in the world today. It becomes even more frightening when that number of deaths is the product of a territory whose population is now numbered at best only eight million persons.

Today's war in Nigeria bears such a striking resemblance to the events of its early history that some comment is required. Just as in the days of the slave trade, the combatants are Nigerians, but those who are most likely to ultimately gain are, with the exception of the Soviet Union and Egypt, the same colonial powers who competed in the same arena once before. Nigerian lives and assets are being destroyed to satisfy European values. These values may no longer be the economic gain from the sale of slaves and palm oil, but African lives are being sacrificed and it is ultimately European economic interests which are at the foundation of the support of all the non-combatant active participants.

The war is one in which Africans are using European terms, concepts and arms to destroy each other because of a strict adherence to norms conceived in an earlier time and another place which should not be controlling in any present day arena when the mass destruction of human values must be sacrificed to their alter. Russia is a prime example of the use of traditional concepts to achieve her political ends. Nigeria is just one example, but it is one arena in which the Soviet policy is definitely bearing fruit: the ultimate goal of which is the destruction of any useful institutions designed to maximize the values of the African peoples.

Words such as democracy and genocide are relevant to the

functioning of human relations in today's world, but only when they are defined and used in a proper context. Both the United States and the Soviet Union profess to be "democratic", but an analysis of the hierarchy of values and institutional structure of these two nation-states will reveal the irrelevance of the word symbol "democracy" if it is not properly examined: just the same as was the case in the use of genocide claims on behalf of the Biafrans or Ibos. Only by factual examination and application in particular circumstances do such symbols take on an effective meaning.

The example of Nigerian politics is indicative of the disaster that befalls strict adherence to norms established by word symbols which create a totally different system than is workable when a factual context is changed. Superficial examination of Nigerian politics before secession created an impression of normalacy when in truth the whole political system was unworkable in an intensely multi-tribal nation. It is particularly interesting to note as an example of the violence done to traditional Western political concepts that the greatest degree of falsification occurred in Nigeria not where the internal power struggle was the greatest, but where there was the least contest. Candidates were falsely returned unopposed where they had the least prospect of losing.

Regardless of how the present conflict is ultimately resolved, the survivors must attempt to achieve a political process in which people with base values can effectively act through their institutions upon resources to achieve their desired values as an end without necessarily following the forms of political structure forced upon them by a completely different culture.

What that form will be cannot be said at this time, but it is for the Africans themselves to resolve not burdened by either colonial or neo-colonial interventions. The important fact at this point is that without France and Portugal, Biafra would never have been able to carry out the role of a combatant for any more than a brief time. Conversely, Nigeria, without the British and Soviet support might just as well have failed. Surely the resolve among the Biafrans would not have been created without an air force created and operated under a foreign influence so powerful the Nigerian decision-makers were unable to control its actions.

The destruction of the present war is primarily the fault of non-African influence, both historic and present, but its solution should be left to Africans alone. Pressure to reach a solution should be applied by all nations and international organizations of the world community, but none should be in the form of any military aid to the combatants. At the present stage of the conflict, both the United States and the United Nations are in excellent positions to intervene to minimize the already deplorable destruction that has already taken place. Neither of these institutions is tainted with the historical background or the self-serving interests of the other participants, yet both are in the position of leaders in the world community.

What sort of a solution is feasible? The longer the conflict continues, the harder it becomes to reconcile the disputants. The greater the destruction to the Nigerian economy, the harder it will be to integrate the secessionist Ibos into Nigerian society again. The longer the Federal Government continues the

war, the more Biafrans will die and the greater will become the resolve of the survivors because of the created fear of the consequences of surrender. Yet surrender they must. If Biafra were to become an independent state within the territory it now has under its control, it would be completely dependent upon a hostile Nigeria. It would have no supporting resources other than human, not possessed of sufficient agricultural or economic potential to support itself. If Biafra were to be granted independence and the entire Eastern Region, or even some productive sections are granted in order to create a viable state, then either unwilling minorities must be included, creating only a smaller Nigeria to erupt again in a Efik or Ekois rebellion or the minorities will be excluded which will create another Palestinian refugee situation. Both are unsatisfactory solutions to the creation of minimum world public order.

An independent state of Biafra would become an example that most likely would lead to a whole succession of largely ineffective mini-states throughout Africa founded solely on the basis of tribal allegiances. In Nigeria alone the Yoruba have often indicated if Biafra succeeds, then they will secede also. ²⁷¹ Should Nigeria fall apart, the future of many other African nations will be cast in the same dye.

There are those who insist on a "fight to the finish", but they lack not only a sense of realism, but of humanity as well. Guerrilla warfare has been threatened by the Biafrans and if a totally military solution is sought, it is certain to be a result. Such a war would only result in greater destruction and would make it almost impossible to distribute relief supplies to the

women and children who would inevitably die in the bush as has
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already happened in such instances in the present conflict.

The first step to a solution of the conflict must be a complete cessation of armed combat. In order to achieve such a result, the United States and the United Nations must force the active non-combatant participants to withdraw all military aid to both sides just as other nations have done. Without such material support, eventually a peaceful solution must be sought. The sooner the combatants realize they will lose their military capabilities, the sooner they will become more receptive to terms of compromise.

The terms of any compromise must be settled through the Organization of African Unity for its members must realize the values at stake in the entire community and can most effectively aid in the creation of institutions appropriate to the African arena, the least burdened by European concepts, that may ultimately serve as a model to create a more stable Africa that will become a respected and powerful participant in the world arena in its own right. Then the lesson taught by Nigerian dissention may achieve some effective result, but the price has been frightening.

FOOTNOTES

1. N.Y. Times, April 24, 1969, at 1 col. 6.
2. 1964 official census figures indicated that the population of the Eastern Region of Nigeria was 12,388,646. J. MACKINTOSH, NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 552 (1966). [hereinafter cited as MACKINTOSH].
3. Not all of the decrease can be attributed to death as much of the loss is due to areas retaken by the Federal Military Government of Nigeria.
4. The civilian death rate in Biafra from starvation alone was estimated by one conservative relief group to have "leveled off" in January 1969, at 125,000 per month, N.Y. Times, February 1, 1969, at 10, col. 3.
 Senator Edward M. Kennedy estimated that the casualties in the Nigerian Civil War were ten times greater than those in Viet Nam. N.Y. Times, September 24, 1968 at 3, col. 3.
5. I am deeply indebted throughout this discussion to Professor Myres S. McDougal for his concepts of a more useful approach to the study of inter-national law in the contemporary world community than the more traditional, steadfast adherence to specific rules. His concepts in large part form the foundation for the analytic approach to be presented.
6. M. CROWDER, A SHORT HISTORY OF NIGERIA 59 (1962). [hereinafter cited as CROWDER].
7. Id.
8. Id. 59.
9. Id. 61.
10. Id. 62.
11. Id. 64.
12. Id. 68.
13. Id. 75.
14. Id. 108.
15. Id. 110.
16. Id. 114.
17. Id. 131.
18. Id. 134.

19. S. LOCKWOOD, NIGERIA vii (1966) [hereinafter cited as LOCKWOOD].
20. CROWDER, supra note 6, at 152.
21. LOCKWOOD, supra note 19, at vii.
22. CROWDER, supra note 6, at 165. See also R. SKLAR & C. WHITAKER "The Federal Republic of Nigeria," in G. CARTER, ed., NATIONAL UNITY AND TRIBALISM IN EIGHT AFRICAN STATES 18 (1966) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL UNITY].
23. E. AWA, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN NIGERIA 45 (1964) [hereinafter cited as AWA].
24. LOCKWOOD, supra note 19, at vii.
25. CROWDER, supra note 6, at 192.
26. AWA, supra note 23, at 5.
27. Id.
28. CROWDER, supra note 6, at 205.
29. The Northern Protectorate had long been running at a severe deficit and had been supported by subsidies from the South. "This conflicted with the age-old colonial policy that each territory should be self-subsisting." CROWDER, supra note 6, at 213.
30. F. LUGARD, THE DUAL MANDATE IN BRITISH TROPICAL AFRICA 87 (1922).
31. CROWDER, supra note 6, at 225.
32. III LORD HAILEY, NATIVE ADMINISTRATION OF BRITISH AFRICAN TERRITORIES 42 (1951).
33. See CROWDER, supra note 6, at 31-42.
34. AWA, supra note 23, at 3.
35. Id. 4.
36. Id.
37. Garrison, "The Ibos Go It Alone," N.Y. Times, June 11, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 32.
38. AWA, supra note 23, at 6.
39. CROWDER, supra note 6, at 209.
40. Id.

41. Some sections of Iboland were not finally brought under effective British control until as late as 1918. See CROWDER, supra note 6, at 205.
42. Garrison, "The Ibos Go It Alone," N.Y. Times, June 11, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 34. Ibos constitute more than one-third of the non-indigenous population in the urban centers in the former Northern and Western Regions. J. COLEMAN, NIGERIA: BACKGROUND TO NATIONALISM 16 (1958)[hereinafter cited as COLEMAN].
43. COLEMAN, supra note 42, at 140.
44. CROWDER, supra note 6, at 228.
45. LOCKWOOD, supra note 19, at vii.
46. CROWDER, supra note 6, at 242.
47. LOCKWOOD, supra note 19, at vii.
48. Id.
49. CROWDER, supra note 6, at 250.
50. LOCKWOOD, supra note 19, at vii.
51. Id. viii.
52. CROWDER, supra note 6, at 258.
53. COLEMAN, supra note 42, at 399.
54. CROWDER, supra note 6, at 253.
55. LOCKWOOD, supra note 19, at viii.
56. CROWDER, supra note 6, at 263.
57. Id. 262.
58. LOCKWOOD, supra note 19, at viii. Garrison, "Biafra vs. Nigeria: The Other Dirty Little War," N.Y. Times, March 31, 1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 37.
59. J. O'CONNELL, "Political Parties In Nigeria," in L. Blitz, ed., THE POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION OF NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT 141 (1965) [hereinafter cited as O'CONNELL].
60. Id. 142.
61. Id. 145.
62. Id. 143.
63. Id. 148.

64. Id. 151.
65. Id. 165.
66. Id. 152.
67. Id.
68. See note 42 supra.
69. BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 35 (1958).
70. J. MACKINTOSH, NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS: PRELUDE TO THE REVOLUTION 552 (1966) [hereinafter cited as MACKINTOSH].
71. U.S. News and World Report, October 10, 1960, at 94.
72. "Nigeria: Tribalism Against Unity," 3 ON RECORD No. 5, 7 [hereinafter cited as ON RECORD].
73. Id. 12.
74. MACKINTOSH, supra note 70, at 510.
75. The National Conference of Nigeria and the Camerouns changed its name to the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens after the 1961 plebiscite in which the Southern Camerouns voted to join the Cameroun Republic.
76. O'CONNELL, supra note 59, at 157.
77. Id. 154.
78. ON RECORD, supra note 72, at 16.
79. Id.
80. MACKINTOSH, supra note 70, at 446.
81. Id. 450.
82. Id.
83. Id. 453-455.
84. ON RECORD, supra note 72, at 28.
85. MACKINTOSH, supra note 70, at 546.
86. Id. 547.
87. Id.
88. ON RECORD, supra note 72, at 22.

89. It is interesting to note that the 1962 census indicated an overall increase in the North of 30 per cent, the East 71 per cent and the West slightly more than 70 per cent. MACKINTOSH, supra note 70, at 553.
90. ON RECORD, supra note 72, at 45.
- 90a. MACKINTOSH, supra note 70, at 558 et. seq.
91. Whether correct or not, many members of the UPGA felt that they could win by capturing thirty to forty seats in the North. Id. 550, 582.
92. ON RECORD, supra note 72, at 45.
93. MACKINTOSH, supra note 70, at 558.
94. NATIONAL UNITY, supra note 22, at 124.
95. The Times, London, December 31, 1964, at 4, col. 1.
96. ON RECORD, supra note 72, at 45.
97. Id. 47.
98. NATIONAL UNITY, supra note 22, at 124.
99. Id.
100. ON RECORD, supra note 72, at 50.
101. N.Y. Times, November 8, 1965, at 1, col. 1.
102. Id. January 11, 1966, at 11, col. 4.
103. Hearings on Nigerian-Biafran Relief Situation Before the Subcomm. on African Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations. 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 48 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Hearings].
104. ON RECORD, supra note 72, at 47.
105. 1968 Hearings, supra note 103, at 48.
106. N.Y. Times, January 20, 1966, at 1, col. 6.
107. 1968 Hearings, supra note 103, at 47.
108. Id.
109. Economist, London, May 28, 1966, at 2, col. 1.
110. 1968 Hearings, supra note 103, at 48.
111. Id. ON RECORD, supra note 72, at 65.

112. ON RECORD, supra note 72, at 65.
113. Id. 71. N.Y. Times, June 25, 1967, § 4 (Editorials), at 5, col. 2.
114. 1968 Hearings, supra note 103, at 48.
115. Id.
116. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1968, at 33, col. 2.
117. Id., March 12, 1967, at 19, col. 1.
118. Id., April 20, 1967, at 9, col. 1.
119. Id., May 31, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
120. See Appendix I for a map of Nigeria depicting the four regions.
121. Manchester Guardian, May 29, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
122. Garrison, "The Ibos Go It Alone," N.Y. Times, June 11, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 30.
123. G. BASDEN, AMONG THE IBOS OF NIGERIA (2 ed. 1966).
124. Garrison, "The Ibos Go It Alone," N.Y. Times, June 11, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 35.
125. N.Y. Times, May 31, 1967, at 14, col. 4.
126. Id.
127. Id. August 14, 1968, at 6, col. 5.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id., June 25, 1967, § 4 (Editorials), at 5, col. 2.
131. Enahoro, "Nigeria's Struggle For Survival" Statements made at a Press Conference in Connaught Rooms, Kingsway, London, July 17, 1967, at 6. (Published by the Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations) [hereinafter cited as Enahoro].
132. N.Y. Times, January 24, 1969, at 50, Col. 1.
133. Fitch & Oppenheimer, "Biafra: Let Them Eat Oil," Ramparts Magazine, September 7, 1968, at 34, hereinafter cited as Fitch.
134. Manchester Guardian, May 31, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
135. N.Y. Times, January 29, 1969, at 4, col. 4.
136. Id. August 9, 1967, at 9, col. 1.

137. Manchester Guardian, May 31, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
138. N.Y. Times, August 1, 1967, at 7, col. 1.
139. The Royal Dutch-Shell-B.P. second quarter 1966 royalties amounted to \$19.5-million alone. N.Y. Times, August 8, 1967, at 8, col. 1.
140. Id., May 29, 1967, at 11, col. 3.
141. Id., August 8, 1967, at 8, col. 1.
- 141a. Enahoro, supra note 131, at 7. See Appendix I.
142. Times, London, May 31, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
143. 1968 Hearings, supra note 103, at 51.
144. N.Y. Times, May 31, 1967, at 14, col. 4.
145. Id., July 8, 1968, at 33, col. 4.
146. Id., at 34, col. 2.
147. Enahoro, supra note 131, at 7.
148. N.Y. Times, August 22, 1967, at 4, col. 1.
149. M. MCDUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 130, (1961),
150. Id. 179.
151. N.Y. Times, August 14, 1967, at 10, col. 1.
152. Id., August 22, 1967, at 4, col. 2.
153. It is estimated that the oil reserves of Nigeria would have been capable of producing one million barrels of oil a day by 1970, had it not been for the continuation of hostilities. N.Y. Times, January 24, 1969, at 56, col. 1.
154. Id., September 21, 1967, at 12, col. 1.
155. Id., October 5, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
156. Id., August 6, 1967, at 17, col. 2.
157. Id., August 9, 1967, at 11, col. 1.
158. Id., October 20, 1967, at 21, col. 3.

159. For example, it was reported that when the Biafrans captured the Midwest Region with little or no resistance, the Federal troops hid in their villages only to re-emerge when the Biafrans were forced out — sans their weapons and uniforms. N.Y. Times, September 23, 1967, at 10, col. 6.
160. Id., January 2, 1968, at 4, col. 3.
161. Id., January 6, 1968, at 11, col. 1.
162. Id., January 31, 1968, at 16, col. 4.
163. Id., May 26, 1968, § 4 (Editorials), at 10, col. 1.
164. Id., September 1, 1968, at 23, col. 1. Id., September 10, 1968, at 3, col. 4.
165. Id., February 5, 1969, at 7, col. 1.
166. Id., April 6, 1969, at 13, col. 1.
167. Id., April 24, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
168. Id., May 12, 1969, at 17, col. 3.
169. Id., April 27, 1969, § 4 (Editorials), at 7, col. 1.
170. Id., May 31, 1969, at 3, col. 2.
171. Id., May 29, 1969, at 13, col. 1.
172. Id., August 21, 1967, at 6, col. 1.
173. Id., March 23, 1969, § 4 (Editorials), at 2, col. 2.
174. Id., August 7, 1968, at 20, col. 2.
175. Id., November 5, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
176. Id., June 30, 1968, at 14, col. 6.
177. Id., June 9, 1968, at 3, col. 8.
178. Id., July 30, 1968, at 12, col. 7.
179. Id., June 20, 1968, at 15, col. 1.
180. Lagos warned it would shoot down all unauthorized flights into Biafra. It urged all relief organizations to "cooperate to avoid embarrassing incidents." N.Y. Times, July 6, 1968, at 1, col. 7.
181. Id., June 27, 1968, at 4, col. 4.
182. Id., July 29, 1968, at 30, col. 4.

183. The ICRC stated that it would provide registration numbers and radio frequencies of all its aircraft which were to commence flights into Biafra. Id.
184. Id., July 4, 1968, at 18, col. 2.
185. Id., December 29, 1968, § 4 (Editorials), at 6, col. 1.
186. Id., September 22, 1968, at 7, col. 1.
187. 1968 Hearings, supra note 103, at 13.
188. Id., 9.
189. July 10, 1968, Secretary General U. Thant issued an appeal to Ojukwu to permit international relief supplies to reach the starving despite the fact they would pass through Federal territory. N.Y. Times, July 11, 1968, at 1, col. 5.
190. Id., February 1, 1969, at 10, col. 3. At least at the present time it is impossible to determine with any degree of accuracy the exact number of civilian deaths from non-combat causes. Senator Edward M. Kennedy estimated in December 1968, that 25,000 lives would be claimed each day in January 1969. Washington Post, December 7, 1968, at 12, col. 1. Other independent sources estimated that approximately 200,000 died in October 1968, 300,000 in November, and predicted 500,000 or more would die in December 1968. N.Y. Times, December 5, 1968, at 12, col. 3.
191. See Mallison, "The Zionist-Israel Juridical Claims to Constitute 'The Jewish People' Nationality Entity and to Confer Membership in It: Appraisal in Public International Law," 32 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 983 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Mallison].
192. See a series of articles found in 1948 Jewish Year Book of International Law for a contrary position.
193. Garrison, "The Ibos Go It Alone," N.Y. Times, June 11, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 30, et. seq.
194. Id.
195. Ojukwu stated on September 30, 1968, that a Federal victory "would mean continued genocide for our people" N.Y. Times, October 1, 1968, at 8, col. 1.
196. One example was a full page ad published in the New York Times soliciting tax deductible contributions to seven Jewish foundations to aid Biafra. N.Y. Times, August 8, 1968, at 12.
197. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE: COLLEGE EDITION 604 (1966).
198. Mallison, supra note 191, at 1043.


199. THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE: A UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AIMED AT PREVENTING DESTRUCTION OF GROUPS AND PUNISHING THOSE RESPONSIBLE 2. (OPI 203, 1965).
200. Id., 1.
201. 1968 Hearings, supra note 103, at 53.
202. Id., 24.
203. Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 1968, § 2 at 1, col. 3.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Perham, "Why Biafran Leaders Should Surrender," a Reprint from the Times, London, September 12, 1968, at 2, col. 2.
207. Palmer, "Magnitude and Complexity of the Nigerian Problem," 59 Dept. State Bull. 360 [hereinafter cited as Palmer]. Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 1968, § 2 at 1, col. 4.
208. Observer Team to Nigeria, First Interim Report - Visit to First Nigerian Division, October 2, 1968, at 2.
209. Id.
210. Id., 5.
211. International Observer Team to Nigeria: Second Report on Military Operations in the Nigerian Civil War (undated) at 8.
212. International Observer Team: Third Report on Military Operations in the Nigerian Civil War (undated) at 5.
213. See N.Y. Times, February 22, 1969, at 13, col. 3.
214. Id.
215. Id., June 1, 1968, at 5, col. 1.
216. Id., August 6, 1967, at 17, col. 3.
217. There were numerous accounts of atrocities by both sides in the contest for Port Harcourt. A Nigerian Army officer summed up the attitude of the combatants when he said, "When we enter a town, we do not have time to take prisoners for the first few days," N.Y. Times, May 7, 1968, at 18, col. 3.
218. N.Y. Times, February 20, 1968, at 10, col. 1.
219. Garrison, "Nigeria Vs. Biafra: The Other Dirty Little War," N.Y. Times, March 31, 1968, § 6 (Magazine) at 37 [hereinafter cited as Garrison].

220. Id., October 20, 1968, at 27, col. 1.
221. Id., August 1, 1968, at 3, col. 4.
222. Referring to the retaking of the Midwest by Federal troops, the N.Y. Times stated: "Gowon has been unable to maintain or enforce a code of conduct on his soldiers. N.Y. Times, January 18, 1968, at 14, col. 1.
223. See Time Magazine, October 4, 1968, at 36.
224. N.Y. Times, March 9, 1969, at 5, col. 1. Id., April 22, 1968, at 6, col. 1.
225. Id., October 20, 1968, at 27, col. 1.
226. Id., February 8, 1969, at 1, col. 5.
227. Id., February 26, 1969, at 3, col. 2.
228. Id., March 2, 1969, § 4 (Editorials), at 2, col. 1.
229. The Egyptians "are extraordinarily inept pilots, who in months of trying to demolish the rebel airstrip between Uli and Ihiata have accomplished almost nothing. "N.Y. Times, March 6, 1969, at 4, col. 3.
230. The Times, London, ran a series of articles which gave detailed reports of the results of the bombings. As a result of this publicity, considerable discussion took place in Parliament regarding Britain's role in supplying arms to Nigeria. Only the willingness of the Soviets to fill the gap which would be left by Britain's action saved the Nigerian supporters.
231. N.Y. Times, February 23, 1969, § 4 (Editorials), at 12, col. 1.
232. Id., March 26, 1969, at 7, col. 1.
233. Id., April 1, 1969, at 4, col. 3.
234. Id., September 24, 1968, at 3, col. 3.
235. Id., February 27, 1968, at 42, col. 2. Id., May 9, 1968, at 5, col. 5.
236. Garrison, guerrilla note 219, at 36.
237. Id.
238. Id., September 13, 1967, at 46, col. 2.
239. Id.
240. Id., November 26, 1967, at 9, col. 1.

241. Id., September 16, 1968, at 17, col. 1.
242. Id., December 18, 1967, at 36, col. 1.
243. For example, see Id., June 10, 1968, at 9, col. 1, and Id., July 19, 1968, at 6, col. 3.
244. Wilde, "Keeping Biafra Alive," Time Magazine, December 6, 1968, at 44, N.Y. Times, August 5, 1968, at 8, col. 7 [hereinafter cited as Wilde].
245. Palmer, supra note 207, at 360.
246. Id., November 22, 1968, at 13, col. 2. NATIONAL UNITY, supra note 22, at 129.
247. U.S. Dept. of State Bull., August 4, 1969, at 94, 99.
248. Garrison, supra note 219, at 42.
249. Id., November 5, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
250. Id., April 24, 1968, at 7, col. 1.
251. Id., August 18, 1967, at 3, col. 8.
252. Id., July 10, 1968, at 3, col. 5.
253. Id., April 14, 1968, at 5, col. 1.
254. Id., August 20, 1967, at 20, col. 1.
255. Id., March 9, 1969, at 5, col. 1.
256. Garrison, supra note 219, at 42.
257. N.Y. Times, November 22, 1968, at 13, col. 1.
258. Id., November 22, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
259. G. ANGLIN, NIGERIA 248 (1964).
260. Garrison, supra note 219, at 42.
261. N.Y. Times, August 16, 1968, at 1, col. 7.
262. Wilde, supra note 244, at 44.
263. N.Y. Times, August 1, 1968, at 3, col. 7.
264. Id., August 3, 1968, at 3, col. 1.
265. Id., March 17, 1969, at 6, col. 3.
266. Id., November 19, 1968, at 1, col. 2.

267. Garrison, supra note 219, at 42. See also Fitch, supra note 133, at 34.
268. N.Y. Times, November 3, 1968, § 5 (Financial), at 15, col. 1.
269. Id., January 26, 1968, at 51, col. 1.
270. Id., January 24, 1969, at 51, col. 1.
271. Id., June 12, 1967, at 3, col. 1. Manchester Guardian, May 30, 1967, at 8, col. 6.
272. N.Y. Times, March 23, 1969, § 4 (Editorials), at 2, col. 1.

APPENDIX I



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Civil war in Nigeria :



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